

years later in view of its notable success, inspired subsequent royal or imperial occasions in this country and elsewhere. Even the most traditionalist dynasties – the Habsburgs in 1908, the Romanovs in 1913 – discovered the merits of this form of publicity. It was new insofar as it was directed at the public, unlike traditional royal ceremonials designed to symbolize the rulers' relation to the divinity and their position at the apex of a hierarchy of grandees. After the French Revolution every monarch had, sooner or later, to learn to change from the national equivalent of 'King of France' to 'King of the French', that is, to establish a direct relation to the collectivity of his or her subjects, however lowly. Though the stylistic option of a 'bourgeois monarchy' (pioneered by Louis Philippe) was available, it seems to have been taken only by the kings of modest countries wishing to maintain a low profile – the Netherlands, Scandinavia – though even some of the most divinely ordained rulers – notably the Emperor Francis Joseph – appear to have fancied the role of the hard-working functionary living in spartan comfort.

Technically there was no significant difference between the political use of monarchy for the purpose of strengthening effective rulers (as in the Habsburg, Romanov, but also perhaps in the Indian empires) and building the symbolic function of crowned heads in parliamentary states. Both relied on exploiting the royal person, with or without dynastic ancestors, on elaborate ritual occasions with associated propagandist activities and a wide participation of the people, not least through the captive audiences available for official indoctrination in the educational system. Both made the ruler the focus of his people's or peoples' unity, the symbolic representative of the country's greatness and glory, of its entire past and continuity with a changing present. Yet the innovations were perhaps more deliberate and systematic where, as in Britain, the revival of royal ritualism was seen as a necessary counterweight to the dangers of popular democracy. Bagehot had already recognized the value of political deference and the 'dignified', as distinct from the 'efficient', parts of the constitution in the days of the Second Reform Act. The old Disraeli, unlike the young, learned to use 'reverence for the throne and its occupant' as 'a mighty instrument of power and influence' and by the end of Victoria's reign the nature of the device was well understood. J. E. C. Bodley wrote about the coronation of Edward VII:

The usage by an ardent yet practical people of an ancient rite to signalise the modern splendours of their empire, the recognition

by a free democracy of a hereditary crown, as a symbol of the world-wide domination of their race, constitute no mere pageant, but an event of the highest historical interest.³⁵

Glory and greatness, wealth and power, could be symbolically shared by the poor through royalty and its rituals. The greater the power, the less attractive, one may suggest, was the bourgeois option for monarchy. And we may recall that in Europe monarchy remained the universal state form between 1870 and 1914, except for France and Switzerland.

II

The most universal political traditions invented in this period were the achievement of states. However, the rise of organized mass movements claiming separate or even alternative status to states, led to similar developments. Some of these movements, notably political Catholicism and various kinds of nationalism, were keenly aware of the importance of ritual, ceremonial and myth, including, normally, a mythological past. The significance of invented traditions is all the more striking when they arose among rationalist movements which were, if anything, rather hostile to them and lacked prefabricated symbolical and ritual equipment. Hence the best way to study their emergence is in one such case – that of the socialist labour movements.

The major international ritual of such movements, May Day (1890), was spontaneously evolved within a surprisingly short period. Initially it was designed as a single simultaneous one-day strike and demonstration for the eight-hour day, fixed on a date already associated for some years with this demand in the U.S.A. The choice of this date was certainly quite pragmatic in Europe. It probably had no ritual significance in the U.S.A., where 'Labour Day' had already been established at the end of summer. It has been suggested, not implausibly, that it was fixed to coincide with 'Moving Day', the traditional date for ending hiring contracts in New York and Pennsylvania.³⁶ Though this, like similar contractual periods in parts of traditional European agriculture, had originally formed part of the symbolically charged annual cycle of the pre-industrial labouring

³⁵ J. E. C. Bodley, *The Coronation of Edward VII: A Chapter of European and Imperial History* (London, 1903), pp. 153, 201.

³⁶ Maurice Dommanget, *Histoire du Premier Mai* (Paris, 1953), pp. 36–7.

year, its connection with the industrial proletariat was clearly fortuitous. No particular form of demonstration was envisaged by the new Labour and Socialist International. The concept of a workers' festival was not only not mentioned in the original (1889) resolution of that body, but was actively rejected on ideological grounds by various revolutionary militants.

Yet the choice of a date so heavily charged with symbolism by ancient tradition proved significant, even though – as Van Gennep suggests – in France the anticlericalism of the labour movement resisted the inclusion of traditional folklore practices in its May Day.³⁷ From the start the occasion attracted and absorbed ritual and symbolic elements, notably that of a quasi-religious or numinous celebration ('Maifeier'), a holiday in both senses of the word. (Engels, after referring to it as a 'demonstration', uses the term 'Feier' from 1893.³⁸ Adler recognized this element in Austria from 1892, Vandervelde in Belgium from 1893.) Andrea Costa expressed it succinctly for Italy (1893): 'Catholics have Easter; henceforth the workers will have their own Easter';³⁹ there are rarer references to Whitsun also. A curiously syncretic 'May Day sermon' from Charleroi (Belgium) survives for 1898 under the joint epigraphs 'Proletarians of all lands, unite' and 'Love one another'.⁴⁰

Red flags, the only universal symbols of the movement, were present from the start, but so, in several countries, were flowers: the carnation in Austria, the red (paper) rose in Germany, sweet briar and poppy in France, and the may, symbol of renewal, increasingly infiltrated, and from the mid-1900s replaced by the lily-of-the-valley, whose associations were unpolitical. Little is known about this language of flowers which, to judge by the May Day poems in socialist literature also, was spontaneously associated with the occasion. It certainly struck the key-note of May Day, a time of renewal, growth, hope and joy (we recall the girl with the flowering branch of may associated in popular memory with the 1891 May Day shootings at Fourmies).⁴¹ Equally, May Day played a

³⁷ A. Van Gennep, *Manuel de Folklore Français I*, iv, *Les Cérémonies Périodiques Cycliques et Saisonnières*, 2: Cycle de Mai (Paris, 1949), p. 1719.

³⁸ Engels to Sorge 17 May 1893, in *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen an F. A. Sorge u. A.* (Stuttgart, 1906), p. 397. See also Victor Adler, *Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe* (Vienna, 1922), i, p. 69.

³⁹ Dommanget, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

⁴⁰ E. Vandervelde and J. Destrée, *Le Socialisme en Belgique* (Paris, 1903), pp. 417–18.

⁴¹ Maxime Leroy, *La Coutume Ouvrière* (Paris, 1913), i, p. 246.

major part in the development of the new socialist iconography of the 1890s in which, in spite of the expected emphasis on struggle, the note of hope, confidence and the approach of a brighter future – often expressed in the metaphors of plant growth – prevailed.⁴²

As it happened, the First of May was initiated at a time of extraordinary growth and expansion in the labour and socialist movements of numerous countries, and might well not have established itself in a less hopeful political atmosphere. The ancient symbolism of spring, so fortuitously associated with it, suited the occasion perfectly in the early 1890s.

It thus became rapidly transformed into a highly charged annual festival and rite. The annual repetition was introduced to meet a demand from the ranks. With it the original political content of the day – the demand for an eight-hour day – inevitably dropped into the background to give way to whatever slogans attracted national labour movements in a particular year, or, more usually, to an unspecified assertion of the working-class presence and, in many Latin countries, the commemoration of the 'Chicago Martyrs'. The only original element maintained was the, preferably simultaneous, internationalism of the demonstration: in the extreme case of Russia in 1917 the revolutionaries actually abandoned their own calendar to celebrate their May Day on the same date as the rest of the world. And indeed, the public parade of the workers *as a class* formed the core of the ritual. It was, as commentators noted, the *only* holiday, even among radical and revolutionary anniversaries, to be associated with the industrial working class and no other; though – in Britain at least – specific communities of industrial workers had already shown signs of inventing general collective presentations of themselves as part of their labour movement. (The Durham miners' gala was first held in 1871.)⁴³ Like all such ceremonials, it was, or became, a basically good-humoured family occasion. The classical political demonstrations were not necessarily like this. (This character may still be observed in such later 'invented traditions' as the national

⁴² E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Man and Woman in Socialist Iconography', *History Workshop*, vi (Autumn 1978), pp. 121–38; A. Rossel, *Premier Mai. Quatre-Vingt-Dix ans de Lutte Populaire dans le Monde* (Paris, 1977).

⁴³ Edward Welbourne, *The Miners' Unions of Northumberland and Durham* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 155; John Wilson, *A History of the Durham Miners' Association 1870–1904* (Durham, 1907), pp. 31, 34, 59; W. A. Moyes, *The Banner Book* (Gateshead, 1974). These annual demonstrations appear to have originated in Yorkshire in 1866.

festivals of the Italian communist newspaper *Unità*.) Like all of them it combined public and private merry-making and good cheer with the assertion of loyalty to the movement which was a basic element in working-class consciousness: oratory – in those days the longer the better, since a good speech was both inspiration and entertainment – banners, badges, slogans, and so on. Most crucially, it asserted the working-class presence by that most fundamental assertion of working-class power: the abstention from work. For, paradoxically, the success of May Day tended to be proportionate to its remoteness from the concrete every-day activities of the movement. It was greatest where socialist aspiration prevailed over the political realism and trade union calculation which, as in Britain and Germany,⁴⁴ tended to favour a demonstration on the first Sunday of the month over the annual one-day strike on the first of May. Victor Adler, sensitive to the mood of the Austrian workers, had insisted on the demonstrative strike against the advice of Kautsky,⁴⁵ and the Austrian May Day consequently acquired unusual strength and resonance. Thus, as we have seen, May Day was not so much formally invented by the leaders of the movement, as accepted and institutionalized by them on the initiative of their followers.

The strength of the new tradition was clearly appreciated by its enemies. Hitler, with his acute sense of symbolism, found it desirable not only to annex the red of the workers' flag but also May Day, by turning it into an official 'national day of labour' in 1933, and subsequently attenuating its proletarian associations.⁴⁶ We may, incidentally, observe that it has now been turned into a general holiday of labour in the E.E.C.

May Day and similar labour rituals are halfway between 'political' and 'social' traditions, belonging to the first through their association with mass organizations and parties which could – and indeed aimed to – become régimes and states, to the second because they genuinely expressed the workers' consciousness of their existence as a separate class, inasmuch as this was inseparable from the organizations of that class. While in many cases – such as Austrian Social Democracy, or

⁴⁴ Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–17: The Development of the Great Schism* (New York, 1965 edn), pp. 91–7.

⁴⁵ M. Ermers, *Victor Adler: Aufstieg u. Grösse einer sozialistischen Partei* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1932), p. 195.

⁴⁶ Helmut Hartwig, 'Plaketten zum 1. Mai 1934–39', *Aesthetik und Kommunikation*, vii, no. 26 (1976), pp. 56–9.

the British miners – class and organization became inseparable, it is not suggested that they were identical. 'The movement' developed its own traditions, shared by leaders and militants but not necessarily by voters and followers, and conversely the class might develop its own 'invented traditions' which were either independent of the organized movements, or even suspect in the eyes of the activists. Two of these, both clearly the product of our period, are worth a brief glance. The first is the emergence – notably in Britain, but probably also in other countries – of costume as a demonstration of class. The second is linked with mass sports.

It is no accident that the comic strip which gently satirized the traditional male working-class culture of the old industrial area of Britain (notably the North-East) should choose as its title and symbol the headgear which virtually formed the badge of class membership of the British proletarian when not at work: 'Andy Capp'. A similar equation between class and cap existed in France to some extent,⁴⁷ and possibly also in parts of Germany. In Britain, at least, iconographic evidence suggests that proletarian and cap were not universally identified before the 1890s, but that by the end of the Edwardian period – as photographs of crowds leaving football matches or mass meetings will confirm – that identification was almost complete. The rise of the proletarian cap awaits its chronicler. He or she, one may suspect, will find its history linked with that of the development of mass sports, since this particular type of headgear appears first as sporting wear among the upper and middle classes. Whatever its origins, it clearly became characteristic of the working class, not only because members of other classes, or those who aspired to such status, would be reluctant to be confused with proletarians, but also because manual workers did not care to choose (except no doubt for occasions of great formality) to cover their heads in any of the numerous other available fashions. Keir Hardie's demonstrative entry into parliament in a cap (1892) indicates that the element of class assertion was recognized.⁴⁸ It is not unreasonable to suppose that the masses were not unaware of it. In some obscure fashion they acquired the habit of wearing it fairly rapidly in the last decades of

⁴⁷ 'L'ouvrier même ne porte pas ici la casquette et la blouse' observed Jules Vallès contemptuously in London in 1872 – unlike the class-conscious Parisians. Paul Martinez, *The French Communist Refugees in Britain, 1871–1880* (Univ. of Sussex Ph.D. thesis, 1981), p. 341.

⁴⁸ Hardie's own deer-stalker-like cap represents a transitional stage to the eventually universal 'Andy Capp' headgear.

the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century as part of the characteristic syndrome of 'working-class culture' which then took shape.

The equivalent history of proletarian costume in other countries remains to be written. Here we can only note that its political implications were clearly understood, if not before 1914 then certainly between the wars, as witness the following memory of the first National Socialist (official) May Day parade in Berlin 1933:

The workers... wore shabby, clean suits and those sailors' caps which were then a general external recognition sign of their class. These caps were decorated with an inconspicuous strap, mostly of black lacquer, but often replaced by a leather strap with buckles. Social Democrats and Communists wore this type of strap on their caps, the National Socialists another type, parted in the centre. This tiny difference suddenly leaped to the eye. The banal fact that more workers than ever before wore the parted strap on their caps carried the fatal message of a battle lost.⁴⁹

The political association of worker and cap in France between the wars (*la salopette*) is also established, but its pre-1914 history awaits research.

The adoption of sports, and particularly football, as a mass proletarian cult is equally obscure, but without doubt equally rapid.⁵⁰ Here the timing is easier to establish. Between the middle 1870s, at the earliest, and the middle or late 1880s football acquired all the institutional and ritual characteristics with which we are still familiar: professionalism, the League, the Cup, with its annual pilgrimage of the faithful for demonstrations of proletarian triumph in the capital, the regular attendance at the Saturday match, the 'supporters' and their culture, the ritual rivalry, normally between moieties of an industrial city or conurbation (Manchester City and United, Notts County and Forest, Liverpool and Everton). Moreover, unlike other sports with regional or local proletarian bases – such as rugby union in South Wales,⁵¹ cricket in parts of Northern England – football operated both on a local and on a national scale, so that the topic of the day's matches would provide common ground for conversation

⁴⁹ Stephan Hermlin, *Abendlicht* (Leipzig, 1979), p. 92.

⁵⁰ Tony Mason, *Association Football and English Society, 1863–1915* (Brighton, 1980).

⁵¹ Cf. David B. Smith and Gareth W. Williams, *Field of Praise: Official History of the Welsh Rugby Union, 1881–1981* (Cardiff, 1981).

between virtually any two male workers in England or Scotland, and a few score celebrated players provided a point of common reference for all.

The nature of the football culture at this period – before it had penetrated far into the urban and industrial cultures of other countries⁵² – is not yet well understood. Its socio-economic structure is less obscure. Originally developed as an amateur and character-building sport by the public-school middle classes, it was rapidly (by 1885) proletarianized and therefore professionalized; the symbolic turning-point – and recognized as a class confrontation – being the defeat of the Old Etonians by Bolton Olympic in the cup final of 1883. With professionalization, most of the philanthropic and moralizing figures from the national élite withdrew, leaving the management of the clubs in the hands of local businessmen and other notables, who maintained a curious caricature of the class relations of industrial capitalism as employers of an overwhelmingly proletarian labour force, attracted into the industry by a higher wage-rate, by the chance of windfall gains before retirement (benefit matches), but above all by the chance of fame. The structure of British football professionalism was quite different from that of professionalism in sports with aristocratic or middle-class participation (cricket) or control (racing), or from that of the demotic entertainment business, that other means of escape from the working-class fate, which also provided the model for some sports of the poor (boxing).⁵³

It is highly likely that football players tended to be drawn from skilled rather than unskilled workers,⁵⁴ probably unlike boxing, a sport which recruited in environments in which the ability to handle oneself was either useful for survival, as in big city slums, or was part of an occupational culture of masculinity, as in the mines. Though the urban and working-class character of the football crowds is patent,⁵⁵ their exact composition by age or social origin is not clear; nor is the development of the 'supporters' culture' and its practices; nor the extent to which the typical football enthusiast (unlike the

⁵² Abroad it was often pioneered by British expatriates and the teams of local British-managed factories, but though it clearly had been to some extent naturalized by 1914 in some capital cities and industrial towns of the continent, it had hardly yet become a mass sport.

⁵³ W. F. Mandle, 'The Professional Cricketer in England in the Nineteenth Century', *Labour History* (Journal of the Australian Society for the Study of Labour History), xxiii (Nov. 1972), pp. 1–16; Wray Vamplew, *The Turf: A Social and Economic History of Horse Racing* (London, 1976).

⁵⁴ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–3.

⁵⁵ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–6.

typical follower of racing) was or had been an active amateur player. On the other hand, it is clear that while as the apocryphal last words of the labour militant indicate, for many of his kind belief in Jesus Christ, Keir Hardie and Huddersfield United went together, the organized movement showed a collective lack of enthusiasm for this, as for several other unpolitical aspects of working-class consciousness. Indeed, unlike central European Social Democracy, the British labour movement did not develop its own sporting organizations, with the possible exception of cycling clubs in the 1890s, whose links with progressive thought were marked.⁵⁶

Little though we know about mass sport in Britain, we know even less about the continent. It would seem that sport, imported from Britain, remained a middle-class preserve very much longer than in its country of origin, but that otherwise the appeal of football to the working class, the replacement of middle-class (amateur) by plebeian (professional) football and the rise of mass urban identification with clubs, developed in similar ways.⁵⁷ The major exception, apart from contests closer to show-business than outdoor activity such as wrestling (suspect to the German gymnastic movement, but with a strong popular following), was cycling. On the continent this was probably the only modern mass sport – as witness the construction of ‘velodromes’ in big cities – four in Berlin alone before 1913 – and the institution of the Tour de France in 1903. It appears that in Germany at least the leading professional cyclists were workers.⁵⁸ Professional championships existed in France from 1881, in Switzerland and Italy from 1892, Belgium from 1894. No doubt the strong

⁵⁶ The Clarion Cycling Clubs come to mind, but also the foundation of the Oadby Cycling Club by a local radical poacher, labour activist and parish councillor. The nature of this sport – in Britain typically practised by youthful amateurs – was quite different from mass proletarian sport. David Prynne, ‘The Clarion Clubs, Rambling and Holiday Associations in Britain since the 1890s’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, xi, nos. 2 and 3 (July 1976), pp. 65–77; anon., ‘The Clarion Fellowship’, *Marx Memorial Library Quarterly Bulletin*, lxxvii (Jan.–Mar. 1976), pp. 6–9; James Hawker, *A Victorian Poacher*, ed. G. Christian (London, 1961), pp. 25–6.

⁵⁷ Of the Ruhr club Schalke 04, thirty-five out of forty-four identifiable members in 1904–13 were miners, workers or artisans, seventy-three out of eighty-eight in 1914–24, and ninety-one out of one hundred and twenty-two in 1924–34. Siegfried Gehrman, ‘Fussball in einer Industrieregion’, in J. Reulecke and W. Weber (eds.), *Familie, Fabrik, Feterabend* (Wuppertal, 1978), pp. 377–98.

⁵⁸ Annemarie Lange, *Das Wilhelminische Berlin* (E. Berlin, 1967), ch. 13, esp. pp. 561–2.

commercial interest in this sport by manufacturers and other advertising interests speeded its popularity.⁵⁹

III

To establish the class presence of a national middle-class élite and the membership of the much larger middle class was a far more difficult matter, and yet rather urgent at a time when occupations claiming middle-class status, or the numbers of those who aspired to them, were increasing with some rapidity in industrializing countries. The criterion for the membership of such classes could be nothing so simple as birth, landownership, manual labour or the receipt of wages, and while a socially recognized minimum of property and income was no doubt a necessary condition for it, it was not a sufficient one. Moreover, in the nature of things such a class included persons (or rather families) of a wide range of wealth and influence, each stratum tending to look down upon its inferiors. The fluidity of borders made clear criteria of social distinction unusually difficult. Since the middle classes were par excellence the locus of social mobility and individual self-improvement, entry to them could hardly be closed. The problem was twofold. First, how to define and separate the genuine national élite of an upper middle class (*haute bourgeoisie*, *Grossbürgertum*) once the relatively firm criteria by which subjective class membership could be determined in stable local communities had been eroded, and descent, kinship, intermarriage, the local networks of business, private sociability and politics no longer provided firm guidance. Second, how to establish an identity and a presence for the relatively large mass of those who neither belonged to this élite nor to ‘the masses’ – or even to that clearly inferior order of the petty-bourgeoisie of the ‘lower middle classes’ which at least one British observer firmly classed with the manual workers as belonging to the world of ‘the Board schools’.⁶⁰ Could it be defined, could it define itself, other than as ‘consisting essentially of families in the process of rising socially’, as a French observer of the British scene held, or as what was left over when the more obviously recognizable masses and the ‘upper ten’ had been

⁵⁹ Dino Spatazza Moncada, *Storia del Ciclismo dai Primi Passi ad Oggi* (Parma, n.d.).

⁶⁰ W. R. Lawson, *John Bull and his Schools: A Book for Parents, Ratepayers and Men of Business* (Edinburgh and London, 1908), p. 39.

subtracted from the population, as an English one did?⁶¹ A further problem arose to complicate the question: the emergence of the increasingly emancipated middle-class woman as an actress on the public scene in her own right. While the numbers of boys in French *lycées* between 1897 and 1907 rose only modestly, the number of girls increased by 170 per cent.

For the upper middle classes or 'haute bourgeoisie' the criteria and institutions which had formerly served to set apart an aristocratic ruling class provided the obvious model: they merely had to be widened and adapted. A fusion of the two classes in which the new components ceased to be recognizable as new was the ideal, though it was probably not completely attainable even in Britain, where it was quite possible for a family of Nottingham bankers to achieve, over several generations, intermarriage with royalty. What made the attempts at such assimilation possible (insofar as they were institutionally permitted) was that element of stability which, as a French observer noted of Britain, distinguished the established and arrived upper bourgeois generations from the first-generation climbers.⁶² The rapid acquisition of really enormous wealth could also enable first-generation plutocrats to buy themselves into an aristocratic milieu which in bourgeois countries rested not only on title and descent but also on enough money to carry on a suitably profligate life-style.⁶³ In Edwardian Britain the plutocrats seized such opportunities eagerly.⁶⁴ Yet individual assimilation could serve only a tiny minority.

The basic aristocratic criterion of descent could, however, be adapted to define a relatively large new upper-middle-class élite. Thus a passion for genealogy developed in the U.S.A. in the 1890s. It was primarily a female interest: the 'Daughters of the American Revolution' (1890) survived and flourished, whereas the slightly earlier 'Sons of the American Revolution' faded away. Though the ostensible object was to distinguish native white and Protestant Americans from the mass of new immigrants, in fact their object was to establish an exclusive upper stratum among the white middle class. The D.A.R. had no more than 30,000 members in 1900, mostly in the strongholds of 'old' money – Connecticut, New York, Pennsyl-

⁶¹ Paul Descamps, *L'Education dans les Ecoles Anglaises*, Bib. de la Science Sociale (Paris, Jan. 1911), p. 25; Lawson, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁶² Descamps, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 67.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁶⁴ Jamie Camplin, *The Rise of the Plutocrats: Wealth and Power in Edwardian England* (London, 1978).

vania – though also among the booming millionaires of Chicago.⁶⁵ Organizations such as these differed from the much more restrictive attempts to set up a group of families as a quasi-aristocratic élite (by inclusion in a *Social Register* or the like), inasmuch as they provided nation-wide linkages. The less exclusive D.A.R. was more likely to discover suitable members in such cities as Omaha than a very élitist *Social Register*. The history of the middle-class search for genealogy remains to be written, but the systematic American concentration on this pursuit was probably, at this period, somewhat exceptional.

Far more significant was schooling, supplemented in certain respects by amateur sports, which were closely linked to it in the Anglo-Saxon countries. For schooling provided not only a convenient means of social comparability between individuals or families lacking initial personal relations and, on a nation-wide scale, a means of establishing common patterns of behaviour and values, but also a set of interlinked networks between the products of comparable institutions and, indirectly, through the institutionalization of the 'old boy', 'alumnus' or 'Alte Herren', a strong web of intergenerational stability and continuity. Furthermore it provided, within limits, for the possibility of expanding an upper-middle-class élite socialized in some suitably acceptable manner. Indeed, education in the nineteenth century became much the most convenient and universal criterion for determining social stratification, though it is not altogether clear when it did so. Mere primary education ineluctably classified a person as belonging to the lower orders. The minimal criterion for accepted middle-class status was secondary education beyond the ages of, say, fourteen to sixteen. Higher education, except for certain forms of strictly vocational training, clearly qualified a person for the upper middle class and other élites. It incidentally follows that the traditional bourgeois-entrepreneurial practice of sending sons into business in their mid-teens, or of eschewing university education, lost ground. It certainly did so in Germany, where in 1867 thirteen out of fourteen Rhineland industrial cities had refused to contribute to the fiftieth anniversary celebration of Bonn university on the grounds that neither industrialists nor their sons used it.⁶⁶ By the 1890s the percentage of Bonn students from families

⁶⁵ Davies, *Patriotism on Parade*, pp. 47, 77.

⁶⁶ Cited in E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital* (London, 1977), p. 59; F. Zunkel, 'Industriebürgertum in Westdeutschland', in H. U. Wehler (ed.), *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte* (Cologne and Berlin, 1966), p. 323.

of the *Besitzbürgertum* had risen from c. twenty-three to just under forty, while those from the traditional professional bourgeoisie (*Bildungsbürgertum*) had fallen from forty-two to thirty-one.⁶⁷ It probably did so in Britain, though French observers in the 1890s still noted with surprise that the English rarely left school after 16.⁶⁸ This was certainly no longer the case in the 'upper middle class', though little systematic work has been done on the subject.

Secondary schooling provided a broad criterion of middle-class membership, but one too broad to define or select the rapidly growing, but nevertheless numerically rather small, élites which, whether we call them ruling class or 'establishment', actually ran the national affairs of countries. Even in Britain, where no national secondary system existed before the present century, a special sub-class of 'public schools' had to be formed within secondary education. They were first officially defined in the 1860s, and grew both by the enlargement of the nine schools then recognized as such (from 2,741 boys in 1860, to 4,553 in 1906) and also by the addition of further schools recognized as belonging to the élite class. Before 1868, two dozen schools at most had a serious claim to this status, but by 1902, according to Honey's calculations, they consisted of a minimum 'short list' of up to sixty-four schools and a maximum 'long list' of up to one hundred and four schools, with a fringe of perhaps sixty of more doubtful standing.⁶⁹ Universities expanded at this period by rising admissions rather than by new foundations, but this growth was sufficiently dramatic to produce serious worries about the overproduction of graduates, at least in Germany. Between the mid-1870s and the mid-1880s student numbers approximately doubled in Germany, Austria, France and Norway and more than doubled in Belgium and Denmark.⁷⁰ The expansion in the U.S.A. was even more spectacular. By 1913 there were 38.6 students per 10,000

⁶⁷ K. H. Jarausch, 'The Social Transformation of the University: The Case of Prussia 1865-1915', *Journal of Social History*, xii, no. 4 (1979), p. 625.

⁶⁸ Max Leclerc, *L'Éducation des Classes Moyennes et Dirigeantes en Angleterre* (Paris, 1894), pp. 133, 144; P. Bureau, 'Mon Séjour dans une Petite Ville d'Angleterre', *La Science Sociale (suivant la Méthode de F. Le Play)*, 5th yr, ix (1890), p. 70. Cf. also Patrick Joyce, *Work, Society and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England* (Brighton, 1980), pp. 29-34.

⁶⁹ J. R. de S. Honey, *Tom Brown's Universe: The Development of the Victorian Public School* (London, 1977), p. 273.

⁷⁰ J. Conrad, 'Die Frequenzverhältnisse der Universitäten der hauptsächlichsten Kulturländer auf dem Europäischen Kontinent', *Jahrbücher f. N. Ö. K. u. Statistik*, 3rd series, i (1891), pp. 376-94.

population in that country, compared with the usual continental figure of 9-11.5 (and less than 8 in Britain and Italy).⁷¹ The problem of defining the effective élite within the growing body of those who possessed the required educational membership card was real.

In the broadest sense it was attacked by institutionalization. The *Public Schools Yearbook* (published from 1889) established the member schools of the so-called Headmasters' Conference as a recognizable national or even international community, if not of equals, then at least of comparables; and Baird's *American College Fraternities* (seven editions between 1879 and 1914) did the same for the 'Greek Letter Fraternities', membership of which indicated the élite among the mass of American university students. Yet the tendency of the aspiring to imitate the institutions of the arrived made it desirable to draw a line between the genuine 'upper middle classes' or élites and those equals who were less equal than the rest.⁷² The reason for this was not purely snobbish. A growing national élite also required the construction of genuinely effective networks of interaction.

Here, it may be suggested, lies the significance of the institution of the 'old boys', 'alumni' or 'Alte Herren' which now developed, and without which 'old boy networks' cannot exist as such. In Britain 'old boy dinners' appear to have started in the 1870s, 'old boy associations' at about the same time - they multiplied particularly in the 1890s, being followed shortly after by the invention of a suitable 'old school tie'.⁷³ Indeed it was not before the end of the century that the practice of sending sons to the father's old school appears to have become usual: only 5 per cent of Arnold's pupils had sent their sons to Rugby.⁷⁴ In the U.S.A. the establishment of 'alumni chapters' also began in the 1870s, 'forming circles of cultivated men who would not otherwise know each other',⁷⁵ and so, a little later,

⁷¹ Joseph Ben-David, 'Professions in the Class System of Present-Day Societies', *Current Sociology*, xii, no. 3 (1963-4), pp. 63-4.

⁷² 'In consequence of the general snobbery of the English, above all of the English rising in the social scale, the education of the Middle Classes tends to model itself upon that of the Upper Middle Class, though with less expenditure of time and money.' Descamps, *L'Éducation dans les Ecoles Anglaises*, p. 67. The phenomenon was far from purely British.

⁷³ *The Book of Public School, Old Boys, University, Navy, Army, Air Force and Club Ties*, intro. by James Laver (London, 1968), p. 31; see also Honey, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Honey, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁷⁵ W. Raimond Baird, *American College Fraternities: A Descriptive Analysis of the Society System of the Colleges of the US with a Detailed Account of each Fraternity*, 4th edn (New York, 1890), pp. 20-1.

did the construction of elaborate fraternity houses in the colleges, financed by the alumni who thus demonstrated not only their wealth, and the intergenerational links but also – as in similar developments in the German student 'Korps'⁷⁶ – their influence over the younger generation. Thus Beta Theta Pi had sixteen alumni chapters in 1889 but one hundred and ten in 1913; only a single fraternity house in 1889 (though some were being built), but forty-seven in 1913. Phi Delta Theta had its first alumni association in 1876 but by 1913 the number had grown to about one hundred.

In the U.S.A. and in Germany the role of these intergenerational networks was consciously played out, possibly because in both countries their initial role as suppliers of men in public service was very clear. The 'Alte Herren' active in the 'Kösener Korps', the élite associations of this kind in the 1870s, included 18 ministers, 835 civil servants, 648 judicial officials, 127 municipal officials, 130 soldiers, 651 medical men (10 per cent of them officials), 435 secondary and university teachers and 331 lawyers. These greatly outnumbered the 257 'landowners', the 241 bankers, company directors and merchants, the 76 in technical and the 27 in scientific professions and the 37 'artists and editors'.⁷⁷ The earlier American college fraternities

Table 2. *Alumni of Delta Kappa Epsilon (Dartmouth)*⁷⁸

	1850s	1890s
Civil service and law	21	21
Medical	3	17
Clergy	6	10
Teaching	8	12
Business	8	27
Journalism and intellectual	1	10
Other	3	5
Total	50	102

also stressed such alumni (Beta Theta Pi in 1889 prided itself on nine senators, forty congressmen, six ambassadors and fifteen governors), but, as Table 2 shows, economic and political development gave them an increasingly modest place, and in the 1900s they gave increasing

⁷⁶ Bernard Oudin, *Les Corporations Allemandes d'Etudiants* (Paris, 1962), p. 19; Detlef Grieswelle, 'Die Soziologie der Kösener Korps 1870–1914', in *Student und Hochschule im 19 Jahrhundert: Studien und Materialien* (Göttingen, 1975).

⁷⁷ Grieswelle, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

⁷⁸ *Delta Kappa Epsilon Catalog* (1910).

prominence to their capitalists. And indeed a body like Delta Kappa Epsilon, which in 1913 included a Cabot Lodge and a Theodore Roosevelt, as well as eighteen eminent New York bankers, among them J. P. Morgan and a Whitney, nine powerful businessmen from Boston, three pillars of Standard Oil, and even in remote Minnesota a James N. Hill and a Weyerhaeuser, must have been a formidable business mafia. In Britain, it is safe to say, the informal networks, created by school and college, reinforced by family continuity, business sociability and clubs, were more effective than formal associations. How effective may be judged by the record of such institutions as the code-breaking establishment at Bletchley and the Special Operations Executive in the second world war.⁷⁹ Formal associations, unless deliberately restricted to an élite – like the German 'Kösener Korps' which between them comprised 8 per cent of German students in 1887, 5 per cent in 1914⁸⁰ – served largely, it may be suggested, to provide general criteria of social 'recognizability'. Membership of *any* Greek Letter Fraternity – even the vocational ones which multiplied from the end of the 1890s⁸¹ – and possession of *any* tie with diagonal stripes in some combination of colours served the purpose.

However, the crucial informal device for stratifying a theoretically open and expanding system was the self-selection of acceptable social partners, and this was achieved above all through the ancient aristocratic pursuit of sport, transformed into a system of formal contests against antagonists selected as worthy on social grounds. It is significant that the best criterion for the 'public-school community' discovered is by the study of which schools were ready to play games against each other,⁸² and that in the U.S.A. the élite universities (the 'Ivy League') were defined, at least in the dominant north-east, by the selection of colleges choosing to play each other at football, in that country essentially a college sport in origin. Nor is it an accident that the formal sporting contests between Oxford and Cambridge developed essentially after 1870, and especially between 1890 and 1914 (see Table 3). In Germany this social criterion was specifically recognized:

⁷⁹ R. Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War* (London, 1980 edn), pp. 55–6.

⁸⁰ Grieswelle, *op. cit.*, pp. 349–53.

⁸¹ Baird lists forty-one fraternities in 1914 unmentioned in 1890. Twenty-eight of them formed after 1900, ten founded before 1890, twenty-eight of these were confined to lawyers, doctors, engineers, dentists and other career specializations.

⁸² Honey, *op. cit.*, pp. 253ff.

Table 3. *Regular Oxford–Cambridge contests by date of institution*⁸³

Date	No. of contests	Sport
Before 1860	4	Cricket, rowing, rackets, real tennis
1860s	4	Athletics, shooting, billiards, steeple-chasing
1870s	4	Golf, soccer, rugby, polo
1880s	2	Cross-country, tennis
1890s	5	Boxing, hockey, skating, swimming, water-polo
1900–13	8	Gymnastics, ice-hockey, lacrosse, motor-cycle racing, tug-of-war, fencing, car-racing, motor-cycle hill climbing (Some of these were later abandoned.)

The characteristic which singles out academic youth as a special social group (*Stand*) from the rest of society, is the concept of 'Satisfaktionsfähigkeit' [the acceptability as a challenger in duels], i.e. the claim to a specific socially defined standard of honour (*Standesehre*).⁸⁴

Elsewhere de facto segregation was concealed in a nominally open system.

This brings us back to one of the most significant of the new social practices of our period: sport. The social history of upper- and middle-class sports remains to be written,⁸⁵ but three things may be suggested. First, the last three decades of the nineteenth century mark a decisive transformation in the spread of old, the invention of new, and the institutionalization of most sports on a national and even an international scale. Second, this institutionalization provided both a public show-case for sport, which one may (with tongue-in-cheek) compare to the fashion for public building and statuary in politics, and a mechanism for extending activities hitherto confined to the aristocracy and the rich bourgeoisie able to assimilate its life-styles to a widening range of the 'middle classes'. That, on the

⁸³ Calculated from Royal Insurance Company, *Record of Sports*, 9th edn (1914).

⁸⁴ Günter Botzert, *Sozialer Wandel der studentischen Korporationen* (Münster, 1971), p. 123.

⁸⁵ For some relevant data, see Carl Diem, *Weltgeschichte des Sports und der leibeserziehung* (Stuttgart, 1960); Kl. C. Wildt, *Daten zur Sportgeschichte. Teil 2. Europa von 1750 bis 1894* (Schorndorf bei Stuttgart, 1972).

continent, it remained confined to a fairly restricted élite before 1914 is another matter. Third, it provided a mechanism for bringing together persons of an equivalent social status otherwise lacking organic social or economic links, and perhaps above all for providing a new role for bourgeois women.

The sport which was to become the most characteristic of the middle classes may illustrate all three elements. Tennis was invented in Britain in 1873, and acquired its classic national tournament there (Wimbledon) in 1877, four years before the American and fourteen years before the French national championships. It acquired its organized international dimension (the Davis Cup) by 1900. Like golf, another sport which was to demonstrate an unusual attraction for the middle classes, it was not based on team-effort, and its clubs – managing sometimes rather expensive pieces of real-estate requiring rather expensive maintenance – were not linked into 'leagues' and functioned as potential or actual social centres: in the case of golf essentially for males (eventually largely for businessmen), in the case of tennis for the middle-class young of both sexes. Moreover, it is significant that competitive contests for women followed rapidly on the institution of competitive contests for men: the women's singles entered Wimbledon seven years after the men's, the American and French national championships six years after their institution.⁸⁶ Almost for the first time sport therefore provided respectable women of the upper and middle classes with a recognized public role as individual human beings, separate from their function as wives, daughters, mothers, marriage-partners or other appendages of males inside and outside the family. Its role in the analysis of the emancipation of women requires more attention than it has so far received, as does its relation to middle-class travel and holidays.⁸⁷

It is hardly necessary to document the fact that the institutionalization of sport took place in the last decades of the century. Even in Britain it was hardly established before the 1870s – the Association football cup dates back to 1871, the county cricket championship to 1873 – and thereafter several new sports were invented (tennis, badminton, hockey, water-polo, and so on), or de facto introduced on a national scale (golf), or systematized (boxing). Elsewhere in Europe sport in the modern form was a conscious import of social

⁸⁶ *Encyclopaedia of Sports* (S. Brunswick and New York, 1969 edn): Lawn Tennis.

⁸⁷ For an early recognition of the tennis club as 'part of the revolt of sons and daughters of the middle class', see T. H. S. Escott, *Social Transformations of the Victorian Age* (London, 1897), pp. 195–6, 444. See also R. C. K. Ensor, *England 1870–1914* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 165–6.

values and life-styles from Britain, largely by those influenced by the educational system of the British upper class, such as Baron de Coubertin, an admirer of Dr Arnold.⁸⁸ What is significant is the speed with which these transfers were made, though actual institutionalization took somewhat longer.

Middle-class sport thus combined two elements of the invention of tradition: the political and the social. On the one hand it represented a conscious, though not usually official, effort to form a ruling élite on the British model supplementing, competing with or seeking to replace the older aristocratic-military continental models, and thus, depending on the local situation, associated with conservative or liberal elements in the local upper and middle classes.⁸⁹ On the other it represented a more spontaneous attempt to draw class lines against the masses, mainly by the systematic emphasis on amateurism as the criterion of upper- and middle-class sport (as notably in tennis, rugby union football as against association football and rugby league and in the Olympic Games). However, it also represented an attempt to develop both a specific new bourgeois pattern of leisure activity and a life-style – both bisexual and suburban or ex-urban⁹⁰ – and a flexible and expandable criterion of group membership.

Both mass and middle-class sport combined the invention of political and social traditions in yet another way: by providing a medium for national identification and factitious community. This was not new in itself, for mass physical exercises had long been linked with liberal-nationalist movements (the German *Turner*, the Czech *Sokols*) or with national identification (rifle-shooting in Switzerland). Indeed the resistance of the German gymnastic movement, on nationalist grounds in general and anti-British ones in particular, distinctly slowed down the progress of mass sport in Germany.⁹¹ The rise of sport provided new expressions of nationalism through the choice or invention of nationally specific sports – Welsh rugby as distinct from English soccer, and Gaelic football in Ireland (1884),

⁸⁸ Pierre de Coubertin, *L'Ecole en Angleterre* (Paris, 1888); Diem, *op. cit.*, pp. 1130f.

⁸⁹ Marcel Spivak, 'Le Développement de l'Éducation Physique et du Sport Français de 1852 à 1914', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, xxiv (1977), pp. 28–48; D. Lejeune, 'Histoire Sociale et Alpinisme en France, XIX–XX s.', *ibid.*, xxv (1978), pp. 111–28.

⁹⁰ This must be distinguished from the patterns of sports and outdoor pastimes of the old aristocracy and military, even if they sometimes took to the new sports or forms of sport.

⁹¹ John, *op. cit.*, pp. 107ff.

which acquired genuine mass support some twenty years later.⁹² However, although the specific linking of physical exercises with nationalism as part of nationalist movements remained important – as in Bengal⁹³ – it was by now certainly less significant than two other phenomena.

The first of these was the concrete demonstration of the links which bound all inhabitants of the national state together, irrespective of local and regional differences, as in the all-English football culture or, more literally, in such sporting institutions as the cyclists' Tour de France (1903), followed by the Giro d'Italia (1909). These phenomena were all the more significant as they evolved spontaneously or by commercial mechanisms. The second consisted of the international sporting contests which very soon supplemented national ones, and reached their typical expression in the revival of the Olympics in 1896. While we are today only too aware of the scope for vicarious national identification which such contests provide, it is important to recall that before 1914 they had barely begun to acquire their modern character. Initially, 'international' contests served to underline the unity of nations or empires much in the way inter-regional contests did. British international matches – as usual the pioneers – pitted the nations of the British Isles against each other (in football: those of Britain in the 1870s, Ireland being included in the 1880s), or various parts of the British Empire (Test Matches began in 1877). The first international football match outside the British Isles confronted Austria and Hungary (1902). International sport, with few exceptions, remained dominated by amateurism – that is by middle-class sport – even in football, where the international association (F.I.F.A.) was formed by countries with little mass support for the game in 1904 (France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland). The Olympics remained the main international arena for this sport. To this extent national identification through sport against foreigners in this period seems to have been primarily a middle-class phenomenon.

This may itself be significant. For, as we have seen, the middle classes in the broadest sense found subjective group identification unusually difficult, since they were not in fact a sufficiently small

⁹² W. F. Mandle, 'Sport as Politics. The Gaelic Athletic Association 1884–1916', in R. Cashman and M. McKernan (eds.), *Sport in History* (Queensland U.P., St Lucia, 1979).

⁹³ John Rosselli, 'The Self-Image of Effeteness: Physical Education and Nationalism in 19th Century Bengal', *Past and Present*, 86 (1980), pp. 121–48.

minority to establish the sort of virtual membership of a nation-wide club which united, for example, most of those who had passed through Oxford and Cambridge, nor sufficiently united by a common destiny and potential solidarity, like the workers.⁹⁴ Negatively the middle classes found it easy to segregate themselves from their inferiors by such devices as rigid insistence on amateurism in sport, as well as by the life-style and values of 'respectability', not to mention residential segregation. Positively, it may be suggested, they found it easier to establish a sense of belonging together through external symbols, among which those of nationalism (patriotism, imperialism) were perhaps the most significant. It is, one might suggest, as the quintessential patriotic class that the new or aspiring middle class found it easiest to recognize itself collectively.

This is speculation. The present chapter does not permit us to pursue it further. Here it is only possible to point out that there is at least some *prima facie* evidence for it, seen in the appeal of patriotism to the white-collar strata of Britain in the South African War⁹⁵ and the role of the right-wing nationalist mass organizations – overwhelmingly of middle-class but not *élite* composition – in Germany from the 1880s on, the appeal of Schönerer's nationalism to the (German-speaking) university students – a middle-class stratum profoundly marked by nationalism in a number of European countries.⁹⁶ The nationalism which gained ground was overwhelmingly identified with the political right. In the 1890s the originally liberal-nationalist German gymnasts abandoned the old national colours en masse to adopt the new black-white-red banner: in 1898 only 100 out of 6501 *Turnervereine* still maintained the old black-red-gold.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ It would be interesting, in countries whose language permits this distinction, to inquire into the changes in the mutual social use of the second person singular, symbol of social brotherhood as well as of personal intimacy. Among the higher classes its use between fellow-students (and, as with French polytechnicians, ex-students), brother-officers and the like is familiar. Workers, even when they did not know one another, used it habitually. Leo Uhen, *Gruppenbewusstsein und informelle Gruppenbildung bei deutschen Arbeitern im Jahrhundert der Industrialisierung* (Berlin, 1964), pp. 106–7. Labour movements institutionalized it among their members ('Dear Sir and Brother').

⁹⁵ Richard Price, *An Imperial War and the British Working-Class: Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War, 1899–1902* (London, 1972), pp. 72–3.

⁹⁶ It is to be noted that in Germany the *élite* student Korps resisted the principle of anti-semitism, unlike the non-*élite* associations, though de facto applying it (Grieswelle, *op. cit.*, p. 353). Similarly anti-semitism was imposed on the German gymnastic movement by pressure from below, against some resistance from the old National-Liberal bourgeois leadership of the movement (John, *op. cit.*, p. 65).

⁹⁷ John, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

What is clear is that nationalism became a substitute for social cohesion through a national church, a royal family or other cohesive traditions, or collective group self-presentations, a new secular religion, and that the class which required such a mode of cohesion most was the growing new middle class, or rather that large intermediate mass which so signally lacked other forms of cohesion. At this point, once again, the invention of political traditions coincides with that of social ones.

IV

To establish the clustering of 'invented traditions' in western countries between 1870 and 1914 is relatively easy. Enough examples of such innovations have been given in this chapter, from old school ties and royal jubilees, Bastille Day and the Daughters of the American Revolution, May Day, the Internationale and the Olympic Games to the Cup Final and Tour de France as popular rites, and the institution of flag worship in the U.S.A. The political developments and the social transformations which may account for this clustering have also been discussed, though the latter more briefly and speculatively than the former. For it is unfortunately easier to document the motives and intentions of those who are in a position formally to institute such innovations, and even their consequences, than new practices which spring up spontaneously at the grass roots. British historians of the future, anxious to pursue similar inquiries for the late twentieth century, will have far less difficulty with the analysis of, say, the ceremonial consequences of the assassination of Earl Mountbatten than with such novel practices as the purchase (often at great expense) of individually distinctive number-plates for motor cars. In any case, the object of this book is to encourage the study of a relatively new subject, and any pretence to treat it other than in a tentative manner would be out of place.

However, there remain three aspects of the 'invention of tradition' in this period which call for some brief comment in conclusion.

The first is the distinction between those new practices of the period which proved lasting, and those which did not. In retrospect it would seem that the period which straddles the first world war marks a divide between languages of symbolic discourse. As in military uniforms what might be called the operatic mode gave way to the prosaic mode. The uniforms invented for the interwar mass

movements, which could hardly claim the excuse of operational camouflage, eschewed bright colours, preferring duller hues such as the black and brown of Fascists and National Socialists.⁹⁸ No doubt fancy dress for ritual occasions was still invented for men in the period 1870–1914, though examples hardly come to mind – except perhaps by way of the extension of older styles to new institutions of the same type and, hopefully, status, such as academic gowns and hoods for new colleges and degrees. The old costumes were certainly still maintained. However, one has the distinct impression that in this respect the period lived on accumulated capital. In another respect, however, it clearly developed an old idiom with particular enthusiasm. The mania for statuary and allegorically decorated or symbolic public buildings has already been mentioned, and there is little doubt that it reached a peak between 1870 and 1914. Yet this idiom of symbolic discourse was destined to decline with dramatic suddenness between the wars. Its extraordinary vogue was to prove almost as short-lived as the contemporary outburst of another kind of symbolism, ‘art nouveau’. Neither the massive adaptation of traditional allegory and symbolism for public purposes, nor the improvization of a new and imprecise language of vegetable or female, but in any case curvilinear, symbolism, mainly for private or semi-private purposes appears to have been suited more than temporarily to whatever social requirements gave rise to them. We can only speculate about the reasons, and this is not the place to do so.

On the other hand, it may be suggested that another idiom of public symbolic discourse, the theatrical, proved more lasting. Public ceremonies, parades and ritualized mass gatherings were far from new. Yet their extension for official purposes and for unofficial secular purposes (mass demonstrations, football matches, and the like) in this period is rather striking. Some examples have been mentioned above. Moreover, the construction of formal ritual spaces, already consciously allowed for in German nationalism, appears to have been systematically undertaken even in countries which had hitherto paid little attention to it – one thinks of Edwardian London – and neither should we overlook the invention in this period of substantially new constructions for spectacle and de facto

⁹⁸ The brightest such uniforms appear to have been the blue shirts and red ties of socialist youth movements. I know of no case of red, orange or yellow shirts and none of genuinely multicoloured ceremonial clothing.

mass ritual such as sports stadia, outdoor and indoor.⁹⁹ The royal attendance at the Wembley Cup Final (from 1914), and the use of such buildings as the Sportpalast in Berlin or the Vélodrome d’Hiver in Paris by the interwar mass movements of their respective countries, anticipate the development of formal spaces for public mass ritual (the Red Square from 1918) which was to be systematically fostered by Fascist régimes. We may note in passing that, in line with the exhaustion of the old language of public symbolism, the new settings for such public ritual were to stress simplicity and monumentality rather than the allegorical decoration of the nineteenth-century Ringstrasse in Vienna or the Victor Emmanuel monument in Rome;¹⁰⁰ a tendency already anticipated in our period.¹⁰¹

On the stage of public life the emphasis therefore shifted from the design of elaborate and varied stage-sets, capable of being ‘read’ in the manner of a strip cartoon or tapestry, to the movement of the actors themselves – either, as in military or royal parades, a ritual minority acting for the benefit of a watching mass public, or, as anticipated in the political mass movements of the period (such as May Day demonstrations) and the great mass sporting occasions, a merger of actors and public. These were the tendencies which were destined for further development after 1914. Without speculating further about this form of public ritualization, it does not seem unreasonable to relate it to the decline of old tradition and the democratization of politics.

The second aspect of invented tradition in this period concerns the practices identified with specific social classes or strata as distinct from members of wider inter-class collectivities such as states or ‘nations’. While some such practices were formally designed as badges of class consciousness – the May Day practices among workers, the revival or invention of ‘traditional’ peasant costume among (de facto the richer) peasants – a larger number were not so identified in theory and many indeed were adaptations, specializations or conquests of practices originally initiated by the higher social

⁹⁹ Cf. *Wasmuth's Lexikon der Baukunst* (Berlin, 1932), iv: ‘Stadthalle’; W. Scharau-Wils, *Gebäude und Gelände für Gymnastik, Spiel und Sport* (Berlin, 1925); D. R. Knight, *The Exhibitions: Great White City, Shepherds Bush* (London, 1978).

¹⁰⁰ Carl Schorske, *Fin de Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York, 1980), ch. 2.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Alastair Service, *Edwardian Architecture: A Handbook to Building Design in Britain 1890–1914* (London, 1977).

strata. Sport is the obvious example. From above, the class line was here drawn in three ways: by maintaining aristocratic or middle-class control of the governing institutions, by social exclusiveness or, more commonly, by the high cost or scarcity of the necessary capital equipment (real tennis courts or grouse-moors), but above all by the rigid separation between amateurs, the criterion of sport among the upper strata, and professionalism, its logical corollary among the lower urban and working classes.¹⁰² Class-specific sport among plebeians rarely developed consciously as such. Where it did, it was usually by taking over upper-class exercises, pushing out their former practitioners, and then developing a specific set of practices on a new social basis (the football culture).

Practices thus filtering socially downwards – from aristocracy to bourgeois, from bourgeois to working class – were probably predominant in this period, not only in sport, but in costume and material culture in general, given the force of snobbery among the middle classes and of the values of bourgeois self-improvement and achievement among the working-class élites.¹⁰³ They were transformed, but their historical origins remained visible. The opposite movement was not absent, but in this period less visible. Minorities (aristocrats, intellectuals, deviants) might admire certain urban plebeian sub-cultures and activities – such as music-hall art – but the major assimilation of cultural practices developed among the lower classes or for a mass popular public was to come later. Some signs of it were visible before 1914, mainly mediated through entertainment and perhaps above all the social dance, which may be linked to the growing emancipation of women: the vogue for ragtime or the tango. However, any survey of cultural inventions in this period cannot but note the development of autonomous lower-class sub-cultures and practices which owed nothing to models from higher social classes – almost certainly as a by-product of urbanization and mass migration.

¹⁰² Professionalism implies a degree of occupational specialization and a 'market' barely if at all available among the settled rural population. Professional sportsmen there were either servants or suppliers of the upper classes (jockeys, alpine guides) or appendages to amateur upper-class competitions (cricket professionals). The distinction between the upper- and lower-class killing of game was not economic, though some poachers relied on it for a living, but legal. It was expressed in the Game Laws.

¹⁰³ A Weberian correlation of sport and Protestantism has been observed in Germany up to 1960. G. Lüschen, 'The Interdependence of Sport and Culture', in M. Hart (ed.), *Sport in the Sociocultural Process* (Dubuque, 1976).

The tango culture in Buenos Aires is an example.¹⁰⁴ How far they enter into a discussion of the invention of tradition must remain a matter of debate.

The final aspect is the relation between 'invention' and 'spontaneous generation', planning and growth. This is something which constantly puzzles observers in modern mass societies. 'Invented traditions' have significant social and political functions, and would neither come into existence nor establish themselves if they could not acquire them. Yet how far are they manipulable? The intention to use, indeed often to invent, them for manipulation is evident; both appear in politics, the first mainly (in capitalist societies) in business. To this extent conspiracy theorists opposed to such manipulation have not only plausibility but evidence on their side. Yet it also seems clear that the most successful examples of manipulation are those which exploit practices which clearly meet a felt – not necessarily a clearly understood – need among particular bodies of people. The politics of German nationalism in the Second Empire cannot be understood only from above. It has been suggested that to some extent nationalism escaped from the control of those who found it advantageous to manipulate it – at all events in this period.¹⁰⁵ Tastes and fashions, notably in popular entertainment, can be 'created' only within very narrow limits; they have to be discovered before being exploited and shaped. It is the historian's business to discover them and retrospectively – but also to try to understand why, in terms of changing societies in changing historical situations, such needs came to be felt.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Blas Matamoro, *La Ciudad del Tango (Tango Histórico y Sociedad)* (Buenos Aires, 1969).

¹⁰⁵ Geoffrey Eley, *Re-shaping the German Right* (Yale U.P., London and New Haven, 1980).