Beginning in the late 1940s, confronted by a powerful Soviet propaganda effort aimed at discrediting the United States’ claims to stand for freedom and opportunity, the U.S. government and the American cultural establishment sought ways to counter that propaganda, and to present the history, culture, and values of the United States to the world in a way that would serve their Cold War policy priorities. Groups as diverse as the State Department and United States Information Agency (USIA), the American Library Association and the American Book Publishers Council, the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment, the Asia Society and the Congress for Cultural Freedom engaged in this project, which brought together the government and the private sector in a full-throated defense of what they dubbed “the Free World.” The battles of what became known as the “Cultural Cold War” ranged from heated exchanges at international conferences to dueling theatrical productions to competing literary and cultural journals. It was not all so genteel, of course; the intelligence services of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the nations of the Eastern bloc all worked in covert or duplicitous ways to make cultural products and events serve political purposes, often without the participants’ knowledge or acquiescence. Books became a central weapon in both sides’ cultural-propaganda campaigns. The United States made books available to foreign audiences in multiple ways: at American “Information Center” libraries, through a market-based export initiative called the Informational Media Guaranty (IMG) program, through donations of textbooks and scientific publications to foreign schools and aid programs, and through a government-directed project to translate, publish, and sell American books—with their origins disguised—in foreign markets. The books produced and distributed by these programs, aimed at an audience of elite opinion-makers, sought to counter persistent notions abroad that the United States was an anti-intellectual cultural wasteland and to present an image of the United States as a well-meaning liberal democracy whose civil liberties and democratic institutions
ensured that it would mature past whatever shortcomings from which it might currently suffer. The very diversity of the books involved in these programs, the nation’s cultural diplomats argued, was itself evidence of American freedom.

Many historians have described the rapid shift in attitudes toward the Soviet Union as World War II ended and the Cold War began, and here is not the place to rehash that story in detail. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the cultural tensions that steadily grew through the 1950s existed even before the war ended, and intensified quickly as the armies and governments met on German territory. In their respective sectors of occupied Germany from 1945 on, as David Caute, Michael L. Krenn, and Walter Hixson describe, the Soviets and the Americans confronted each other with culture: theater productions, films, newspapers, and magazines produced by and for the occupied sectors reflected, and at times even depicted, the hostility between the occupying powers. Such cultural products exhibited the basic rhetorical contours of the propaganda war, in which the Soviets attacked the West as decadent, individualistic, and Philistine, while the United States extolled the freedom (artistic as well as political and economic) of the West and accused the Soviets of overseeing a slave empire.

The cultural confrontation between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) quickly spread beyond occupied Germany, and the 1947 formation in Poland of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (Cominform) accelerated the dissemination of Communist propaganda materials outside of what had become the Eastern Bloc. In the face of the USSR’s propaganda blitz, which threatened to turn public opinion in many nonaligned nations against the United States and the Western alliance and to bolster leftist groups and Communist parties in friendly nations such as Greece, France, and Italy, the United States responded with its own push, mandated by a December 1947 National Security Council memo (NSC-4) that urged a greater emphasis on “coordinated information measures” and “programs designed to influence foreign opinion in a direction favorable to US interests” in order to counter the USSR’s “intensive propaganda campaign.” After NSC-4, President Truman’s 1950 “Campaign of Truth” initiative, and NSC-68 (a 1950 memo that stated in the gravest possible terms the need to immediately counter Soviet propaganda through psychological warfare), U.S. information and cultural-diplomacy agencies undertook a wide variety of propaganda and psychological warfare programs intended to counter the arguments made by the Soviets about the West, advance arguments about the nature of the Soviets and other Communists, and (in the words of the 1953 USIA mission statement)
“submit evidence to peoples of other nations . . . that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.” Concurrent with the founding of the USIA was the creation by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) (the group that took charge of psychological warfare) of an “ambitious program to discredit communist ideology and to promote a contrasting ideology of freedom” aimed at “intellectuals and educated elites abroad,” historian Kenneth Osgood points out. Much of this propaganda and psychological warfare took the form of books: “The opportunities to use books and publications abroad are of major importance to U.S. objectives,” Osgood quotes from a 1954 OCB internal report. “American world leadership, the quality of American achievements in scientific, professional, technical, and cultural fields, and the pressing need to reflect this leadership and quality of achievement throughout the world, warrant the greatest possible effort to expand the use of American books throughout the world in the present half-century.”

Including books as a key component of cultural diplomacy was not a new tactic. The United States had run reading rooms in Latin American nations since 1942, and, as Trysh Travis has detailed, during World War II the American publishing industry formed the Council on Books in Wartime to support the Office of War Information (OWI) in its efforts to distribute books to American troops and to populations overseas. Near the end of the war, the council founded “Overseas Editions,” which included titles “intended to reacquaint Europeans with the heritage, history, and fundamental makeup of the USA, plus a picture of our role in the war.” Publishing thirty-six titles in English, French, Italian, and German editions, Overseas Editions became a model for the government-run book programs of the Cold War. The council’s work, as John B. Hench argues, benefited not just the American cultural-diplomatic project but also the publishers themselves, who “managed ‘to do well by doing good.’ . . . [They] play[ed] a significant role in the critically important consolidation phase of American propaganda aimed at de-Nazifying European thought and, during the ensuing Cold War . . . provid[ed] a foil to the spread of communist propaganda.” Such public-private collaborations would typify later cultural-diplomatic undertakings. Cold War-era book programs could not simply replicate the structure of the council and of Overseas Editions, though, in part because the Cold War was more an ideological battle than a military one, and thus the adversaries drew much more heavily on cultural diplomacy as a weapon than they had during World War II. Many more books had to be produced and distributed; the target audiences were dramatically different; and the message
itself, as reflected in the titles chosen, had to change. Changing realities in transportation, distribution, copyright, and currency convertibility also complicated matters.

Distributing books to foreign populations in order to “inform” those populations about a nation is generally considered an example of “cultural diplomacy.” Political scientist Milton C. Cummings Jr. defines cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.” Joseph Nye, in a recent and influential book, called cultural diplomacy “a prime example of ‘soft power,’ or the ability to persuade through culture, value, and ideas, as opposed to ‘hard power,’ which conquers or coerces through military might.”

Historian Frank Ninkovich specifies that “a bedrock principle underlying the cultural approach [to diplomacy is] the conviction that peoples ought to communicate directly with peoples.” Although cultural diplomacy had an initial flowering under Woodrow Wilson and, with a particular focus on Latin America, was revived in the 1940s, historians Richard J. Arndt and Ninkovich, among others, have argued that the United States did not pursue cultural diplomacy with the same seriousness and urgency as did nations like France and Great Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and only realized the importance of cultural diplomacy in the 1940s.

Furthermore, to a far greater extent than other nations, the U.S. diplomatic establishment has relied on private agencies to conduct cultural diplomacy and traditionally has seen the government as a coordinator of cultural diplomacy rather than its driver. As Arndt shows, under the State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations, created in 1938 to direct cultural diplomacy to Latin America, the private sector was to be “the major partner in developing policies,” and the State Department hoped that 95 percent of cultural-diplomacy activities would come from such private bodies as universities, foundations, museums, and the publishing industry. The Council on Books in Wartime was a private, nonprofit organization that pioneered the use of books in cultural-diplomatic outreach. Even after the U.S. government decided, in a series of 1947–48 acts, to authorize, fund, and staff an expansive cultural-diplomacy effort, historian Francis J. Colligan pointed out in 1958, “the advent of the Government into this field has not discouraged these [private, nonprofit] agencies. On the contrary, they have continued and even expanded their activities.” The Smith-Mundt Act (1948) specified that the secretary of state, in selecting materials to be distributed abroad, shall
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utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, the services and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion pictures, and other agencies, through contractual arrangements or otherwise. It is the intent of the Congress that the Secretary shall encourage participation in carrying out the purpose of this Act by the maximum number of different private agencies.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1951, deputy chief assistant librarian of Congress Dan Lacy, temporarily assigned to the Information Center Service (ICS) (which ran the reading rooms abroad), “realized immediately that the publishing industry, with some public assistance when necessary, could be far more effective than government programs” in reaching foreign populations.\textsuperscript{16} The President’s Committee on International Information Activities, chaired by William H. Jackson, recommended in 1953 that, in the anti-Communist information campaign, “the greatest effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of American objectives” and pointed specifically the publishing industry, calling for the government to “subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.”\textsuperscript{17} Unlike the centrally designed and administered book programs of the Soviet Union, U.S. book programs were designed to draw upon the resources, energies, and insight of nongovernmental groups and private companies.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, private groups such as the Ford Foundation played a key role in many of the cultural-diplomacy programs established by the U.S. government, and at times the government used foundations to funnel money covertly to ostensibly independent organizations (a notorious example would be the Farfield Foundation’s intermediation between the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and the Congress for Cultural Freedom).\textsuperscript{19}

If the structure of U.S. cultural diplomacy has rested on a shifting equilibrium between governmental and nongovernmental undertakings, a similar balance underlies the mission or content of cultural diplomacy. We see manifested in the book programs the struggle between the “cultural” approach and the “informational” approach that has characterized American cultural diplomacy from its earliest days. Simply put, the “culturalists,” working on the model of the British Council or the Alliance Française, seek an open and free exchange of culture between the United States and its interlocutors—“peoples . . . communicat[ing] directly with peoples,” in Ninkovich’s formulation. This free exchange, say its advocates, will result in genuine understanding and sympathy between the United States and other nations. The
other pole, the “informationalist” orientation to cultural diplomacy—the dominant mode since the Wilson administration—takes what a cynic might call a propagandistic approach, vetting all messages and cultural exchanges for their compatibility with policy. Within official American cultural-diplomacy bodies (various offices in the State Department and, from 1953 to 1999, the USIA), the informationalist approach has generally dominated, but culturalists have always had some sway. Perhaps the best known of the culturalists was poet and Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, whose 1944–45 tenure as assistant secretary of state for public and cultural affairs brought a culturalist emphasis to an establishment that had been, under the influence of Nelson Rockefeller, largely informationalist.

Reflecting U.S. cultural diplomacy in general, the book programs began (during MacLeish’s tenure at the State Department) with a strongly culturalist orientation but, due to internal and external pressures, over the course of the 1950s became almost entirely informationalist. From the days of the IMG program and the International Information Administration (IIA), to the 1953 Cohn-Schine tour of U.S. Information Centers and the subsequent tightening of book-selection criteria, to the 1961 rewriting of IMG’s strictures, the choice of what books the government would send abroad to represent American culture shrank, and the purpose of the program veered from fostering international understanding of American culture to actively promoting American policies.

Distributing American books abroad, the program’s designers suspected, would not only “sell” the American models of freedom and democracy but also would help to counter the persistent feeling abroad that the United States represented the unstoppable and vulgarizing forces of mass culture and mass consumption as they overwhelmed a more examined or culturally sophisticated way of life. Such sentiments were particularly strong among influential Europeans of what was known as the “non-Communist Left,” who scorned what they saw as the United States’ shallow, business-dominant culture and its “Coca-Colonization” of the rest of the world but who also opposed Stalinist authoritarianism and militarism. To these Europeans, American culture was Mickey Mouse and cowboy movies at best, and malevolent military-imperialist power at worst. In their most damning and persuasive arguments—arguments the Cominform seized on—these intellectuals dismissed American culture as commercial, shallow, exploitive, and venal. American officials grew concerned about this during the Cold War, when even President Eisenhower—whose campaign had derided his opponent, Adlai Stevenson, as an “egghead”—worried that Europeans saw Americans as “a race of materialists. . . . Our successes are described in
terms of automobiles and not in terms of worthwhile cultural works of any kind. Spiritual and intellectual values are deemed to be almost nonexistent in our country.” The book programs were central to the effort to construct of an image of the United States with an intellectual and cultural life equal to Europe’s. As a result, in the ideological book programs examined here (as opposed to those programs that distributed technical or scientific or agricultural books), foreign elites and intellectuals were the primary targets.

The development of book programs and the selection of titles to be distributed also shed light on the role of the free market and the rhetoric of “freedom” in the American cultural-diplomacy push. As Osgood and many other historians have pointed out, U.S. propagandists from the USIA to the OCB to the CIA sought to elucidate an ideology of freedom to counter Communist ideology. Freedom was, after all, the signal characteristic of the West—which of course called itself the “Free World.” And while no unitary “ideology of freedom” was ever developed, in the programs examined in this essay, the statement that came closest to being a general expression of principles underlying the then-dominant liberal view of America was Arthur M. Schlesinger’s *The Vital Center*. In this book, Schlesinger laid out the argument for a liberal anti-Communism. Much of the book, like much of the material of the similarly oriented American Committee for Cultural Freedom, centered on identifying the lies and misleading rhetoric of Communist propaganda, but in doing so *The Vital Center* exemplifies the pragmatic strain of American political thought that motivated the New Dealers and much of the State Department establishment. Contrary to Communist arguments that top-hatted capitalists controlled the political establishment in the United States, Schlesinger argues, “the capitalist state has clearly not been just the executive committee of the business community. It has become an object of genuine competition between classes.” Liberal democracy was committed to the “limited state,” and the competing classes would, with the help of experts, “work out a sensible economic policy” on Keynesian principles. Minimal government involvement in the economy was desirable, to avoid “the interminable enterprise of government regulation.” Regarding civil liberties, while the problem of majority rule versus minority rights seems “insoluble,” in the actual “practice of society” these things tend to work themselves out. Problems arise, inevitably; but the “continuity of American development” ensures that pragmatism and reasoned debate will generally solve them. The process takes care of evils, as in the cases of child labor, unemployment, or old-age poverty. Schlesinger identifies a recurrent pattern of “hysteria, repression, and remorse” in incidents such as the Palmer raids, but inevitably the democratic process works—as it will, he is
confident, in the case of civil rights. Even wars serve their purpose: the Civil War “heal[ed] the social wounds opened up in the age of Jackson,” and World War II “closed the rifts created by . . . the New Deal.”3 Schlesinger’s model of America was that of a humble but inspired experiment that relied on its citizens’ ability to make rational decisions. No utopian, he endorsed a “moderate pessimism about man” to defend against “authoritarianism” or any kind of all-encompassing system such as Communism, but he had faith that the democratic process and the guidance of the steady hands of experts would inexorably continue to improve America. This notion of the United States as a work in progress was one of the recurring themes of the books chosen for the ideological book programs.

Only a governmental effort, of course, could realistically counter the massive Soviet propaganda push. In its use of books as propaganda, the United States lagged badly behind its adversary, which had produced and distributed over forty million books abroad by 1950. The Psychological Strategy Board, late in the Truman administration, ominously reported that “the largest selling book in the world—with the possible exception of the Bible—has been the Short History of the Communist Party” and that this pointed to a “massive, comprehensive, worldwide campaign of ideological indoctrination.”34 Dan Lacy noted in 1956 that “visitors abroad have been repeatedly struck by the ubiquitous presence in many countries of editions of Soviet works, translated and well bound at prices obviously below the cost of production, and by the profusion of free or inexpensive Communist pamphlets.”35 Historian Amanda Laugesen reports that “in the first half of 1957 alone, the USSR published 15,631,700 copies of 372 titles in 12 languages, mostly through the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow.”36 A 1961 State Department report noted that the USSR was producing approximately forty million books a year in free-world languages, up from twenty-five to thirty million annually in the 1950s. The books were largely Marxist-Leninist titles, as well as handbooks on “organizing demonstrations and how to overthrow governments” and fiction by writers such as Sholokhov, Simonov, and Lavreyov that “deal with the struggle for the collectivization of Soviet agriculture, the overthrow of the Czarist regime by the Soviets and the patriotism of Soviet citizens during World War II.”37 Alarm at the Soviets’ apparently unstoppable ability to produce and distribute ideological materials—and at the assumption that these materials would prove persuasive—continued even after the United States initiated its own book programs: in 1961 an internal report fretted that “the Communists have recognized the role of ideas and information in the battle they are waging; Soviet and Chinese Communist books, films, and other informational
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... If American materials are not available, the Communists may pre-empt the field by default.”

Several acts of Congress, initially passed along with the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (the major component of what became known as the “Marshall Plan”), authorized the distribution of American books as instruments of cultural diplomacy. Later acts expanded the number of programs and continued funding existing initiatives, although resistance in Congress to these programs was often strong. Several programs fall outside of my argument here, as they distributed books with little ideological content and were not aimed at elites. Low-Priced Books in English and Ladder Editions primarily disseminated books for the teaching of English as a foreign language. Under Public Law 480 (1954’s Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act) the proceeds from some agricultural sales were used to purchase and distribute textbooks, particularly in India. The Point Four Program, created in 1949, funded the distribution of technical books and journals in impoverished nations; in the sense that technology in the atomic age was a profoundly political issue this program was ideological, but the materials themselves made no arguments about the superiority of the West or the deficiencies of the Soviet system. Franklin Publications—a book program aimed at the Middle East that concealed its governmental origins and funding—is certainly an example of a relevant program, but here I want to focus on a slightly earlier time period (the late 1940s through the mid-1950s) and on a different target audience (influential readers in Western and Central Europe) than was the focus of Franklin Publications. In terms of disseminating ideologically oriented cultural materials to populations (particularly elites) abroad, three major programs—the IMG program, the Library and Information Center Service, and the Books in Translation program—did the majority of the work. Taken together, they and the titles they chose to provide to audiences of foreign elites eschew the hard-line anti-Communism that dominated America’s domestic politics and exemplify the “Vital Center” argument that the cultural-diplomacy establishment favored in the 1950s.

The IMG program, initially authorized by the Economic Cooperation Act, allowed American publishers and media producers to export their materials in nations short of hard-currency foreign exchange. Under IMG, a foreign publisher or distributor could ask the publisher of an American book to sell it a specified number of copies of an American (generally English-language) book, but the foreign publisher could only pay for those books in the local currency—Polish zlotys or Yugoslav dinars, for example. Such “soft” currencies were not easily convertible to dollars, and so the American publisher
had little economic incentive to sell its books to the foreign publisher or distributor. IMG allowed publishers to exchange the foreign currency with the U.S. government for dollars, and the U.S. government would then use the foreign currency for “regular in-country operating expenses.” The IIA of the State Department ran the program until it was taken over by the newly created USIA in 1953. That year, Time magazine explained that IMG had been “one of the most effective means of getting U.S. publications around the world, and under it millions of magazines, books and newspapers have gone abroad. Furthermore, although $8.4 million has been paid out, the money comes back to the U.S. Government in the form of foreign currency, which the Government collects and can use abroad.” In total, over the twenty years of its life, IMG operated in twenty-one nations and paid out over $83 million to publishers. Its initial focus was on Europe—West Germany, Yugoslavia, and Poland, which accounted for $26 million of the $31 million paid out to publishers operating in Europe—but in the mid-1950s the program also began targeting Asian nations such as the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Burma.

IMG was a largely market-driven program, for the selection of titles to be sold abroad would be made either by the U.S. publisher or by a foreign publisher or distributor. Looking back at the program in 1957, an internal policy statement differentiated IMG from the informational activities of USIA (here confusingly called USIS) on the grounds that IMG can, but USIS cannot, 1) overcome exchange barriers to the free flow of US information materials through commercial channels, 2) build, in dollar-short countries, commercial markets for the American mass media industry, and 3) meet the tremendous demand for American books and motion pictures which exists in high priority countries where the free flow of such materials is blocked except for IMG. . . . On the other hand USIS can, but IMG cannot, reach selected audiences with specific informational materials designed to give positive support to particular US objectives.

American governmental agents could not use the program to get desired books sold in target markets, but they could reject a publisher’s application for IMG coverage of a specific title.

Initially, in a pattern common to most of these programs, the standards for IMG coverage were quite loose, allowing it to serve the “cultural” model. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 merely noted that IMG-supported materials should “promote . . . a true understanding of American institutions and policy among the nations” and that the content of this media “is
in fact intended to convey knowledge or is expressive of the life or culture of the United States.” Media assisted under this provision, IMG administrators specified, should reflect the best elements in American life and not “bring discredit upon this Nation in the eyes of other nations.” Childs and McNeil point out that IIA’s interpretation of these criteria was liberal, holding as a guiding principle that “constructive criticism is a hallmark of democracy.”

Three years later, through the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (which authorized IMG coverage outside of European markets), the criteria were tightened. Certain types of books—hobby books, cookbooks, travel guides not focused on the United States, and fashion publications—were excluded. More important for this discussion, though, the 1951 act began to proscribe not just genre but content: materials “patently lewd or salacious [or that] conveyed political propaganda inimical to the best interests of the US” would not be eligible for IMG coverage.

In 1954 appropriations hearings, the USIA’s representative testified that the agency had a “very rigid set of criteria” for eligibility for IMG coverage. Ineligible would be, a Mr. Beers detailed,

A. Materials advocating or supporting an unlawful purpose;
B. Materials prepared or distributed in order to convey, disseminate, or reinforce Communist propaganda;
C. Materials of a salacious or pornographic intent though the inclusion of questionable language, episodes, or scenes in a work of bona fide literary or artistic intent shall not automatically be construed to bring it within this category;
D. Materials devoted to the sensational exploitation as opposed to the factual reporting of crime, vice, or similar conditions;
E. Any other material of so cheap, shoddy, or sensational character as to bring discredit upon the US in the eyes of other nations.

Beers, responding to a question from Michigan senator Homer Ferguson (who was also curious about whether books advocating socialism would be ineligible), argued that these criteria did not constitute censorship because the publishers had to agree to these conditions prior to taking advantage of IMG. Other legislators, who had been suspicious of these types of programs and their liberal intellectual bureaucratic champions since the days of the OWI, fretted about the morality of the materials sponsored by IMG. Minnesota representative Walter Judd, in the 1956 appropriations hearings, wanted to be (and was) reassured that “these lousy films that do us so much damage, like Blackboard Jungle,” were not eligible, and in 1958 Michigan
Representative Alvin Bentley confirmed with Beers that paperbacks with lurid covers were also screened carefully by the IMG administrators.\textsuperscript{39} Because IMG was a market-driven program, the concern here was that the worst kind of American “trash,” which confirmed elites’ prejudices about American culture but was at the same time irresistible to foreign masses, would be subsidized by the bureaucrats and intellectuals at the State Department and USIA, whose own morality was as suspect as their loyalty.

IMG was a target for legislators who doubted the program’s impact and resented its backdoor funding. As IMG had no annual appropriation, it would run debts to pay the publishers in dollars. These debts would then be charged to USIA, which would then borrow the money from the Treasury Department, and “for many in Congress, after-the-fact appropriations requests by USIA to repay the Treasury constituted a serious infraction of the historic rule that Congress controls the purse strings and must appropriate all executive branch funds in advance of use.”\textsuperscript{40} Benjamin calculates that although the program was supposed to pay for itself, “it cost the taxpayer 38 cents for each dollar the publisher received, exclusive of administrative charges from the agency’s budget. This led to charges of ‘subsidy’ by congressional opponents of the program.”\textsuperscript{41} The program underwent an extensive review in the late 1950s and into 1961, but instead of terminating it altogether, Congress imposed much stricter criteria for which titles could be covered. Staving off the program’s elimination was a small victory for the publishing industry and related trade groups. A 1960 pamphlet produced and distributed by the American Book Publishers Council and the Magazine Publishers’ Association (and aimed at Congress) stressed the IMG’s key importance to the cultural Cold War:

- Freedom and communism will be competing indefinitely for the minds and hearts of the world’s uncommitted people;
- For freedom to win this competition, the people of the uncommitted countries must have the scientific, technical, and administrative information to enable them to meet their fundamental economic problems successfully under a free government;
- The weapons of this competition will be ideas and their successful communication.\textsuperscript{42}

The pamphlet insisted that the program “operat[es] at a very low cost” and “is not a giveaway” either to foreign audiences or to publishers. Such arguments only postponed the end, though. The program’s 1968 termination stemmed from several conflicts that had been in play for years, Benjamin points out:
The eligibility standards continued to be considered too liberal by some and too restrictive by others. To some it was a government propaganda device, to others it was a subsidy of commercial exporters, and to still others it spelled detestable censorship. To some the funding method seemed the only feasible way to relate government funding to normal business operations, but to many congressmen it appeared to be “back-door” financing that evaded the original enabling legislation.43

While the titles covered by IMG were selected by American or foreign publishers, the titles included in two other key book programs of the time—the ICS and the Books in Translation program—were chosen by the foreign-policy establishment itself and thus more directly reflect the ideological policing and the increasingly unidirectional, informational approach to cultural diplomacy of the 1950s. These two programs provide the most vivid illustration of how the cultural-diplomacy establishment approached the selection of materials to represent American culture to foreign intellectuals and readers, and of the political pressures that affected these programs during the 1950s.44

The ICS, with its familiar reading rooms, predated the Cold War. The first Information Center was founded in 1942 in Mexico City, undertaken by the informationalist Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs Nelson Rockefeller as part of Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy. Information Centers in Europe, during the war, were taken over by the OWI and became part of the U.S. propaganda push there. After the end of World War II, the State Department (which assumed the responsibilities of the OWI) began opening Information Centers in Germany, Austria, Korea, and Japan. The number of Information Centers and reading rooms exploded through the 1950s, and by 1962 USIA, which administered the program after 1953, had 181 Information Centers in eighty nations, with another eighty-five smaller “reading rooms” and 145 “binational centers.” These libraries’ holdings averaged 10,000–15,000 volumes, but in locations of particular strategic importance the collections were larger—West Berlin’s Amerikahaus held over 50,000 books.45 By the mid-1950s, ICS libraries and reading rooms held two million volumes.46

The process by which a title would be chosen for and added to an Information Center’s collection was relatively simple: either the title would be identified by the field officer (often in consultation with local publishers), approved by Washington, and purchased; or the field officer would simply choose the title from a monthly circular of preapproved titles, some recently
published and some backlist. The Bibliographic Division of the IIA and, later, the ICS of USIA selected the titles listed on the circular, often with the consultation of specialists from the academic, library, and publishing worlds. Audiences who encountered these books in Information Centers, reading rooms, or Amerikahauser would be under no illusion that these books and their contents were not sanctioned by the U.S. government. It is a testament to the sensitivity of the field officers and the confidence of the State Department that so many titles frankly critical of aspects of American life were included and featured in Information Centers, although books touching on inflammatory topics such as race, labor relations, or the Communist movement in the United States had to hew to a very narrow ideological and rhetorical line.

Things worked differently in the Books in Translation program, which began in the late 1940s under the IIA of the Department of State and, like IMG, was transferred to USIA in 1953. The explicit goal of this program was to get the kinds of books—often, in fact, the same titles—that the Information Centers stocked into the hands of local populations—and, in particular, local intellectuals and opinion leaders—in their native languages. As its name indicates, the Books in Translation program sought to identify American books that would be valuable to distribute within a given national market, identify local publishers that could publish the books, arrange for favorable transfers of foreign rights to the titles (and often pay the rights fee, if there was one), hire a translator for the book, purchase a large number of the books for local distribution and use in the Information Center/reading rooms, and eventually send royalty checks to the American publishers. Books in Translation, like many of the other programs examined here, initially was centered in Europe—Germany, Yugoslavia, Poland—but quickly expanded its focus to the Middle East (Israel, Turkey, Egypt), Asia (China, Pakistan, Japan, Korea, India, Burma, Indonesia), and Latin America in the 1960s. Over the course of the 1950s, the Books in Translation program (and its subsidiary, the Low-Priced Book Program) distributed almost fifty million copies of American titles around the world.47

For the most part, the Books in Translation program officers wanted to act merely as facilitators; like IMG administrators, they would simply make it simpler for publishers to sell American books abroad by providing connections and some financial assistance. As with the Information Centers, the titles would be identified by Washington or by the field; unlike the Information Centers, though, in the translations program foreign publishers could initiate a request, although they often did so because of the prodding of a USIA officer. As former Books Officer Sol Schindler explained,
The post overseas had connections with the local publishers. So, we talked shop talk. Do you have anything good as in, do I have any good titles that [I] think would really go. And then I would, in a way almost like a salesman: “Yeah, we’ve got these books just came in, would you be interested in this, in this, and this.” And, then we’d hit upon a mutually agreeable title and we would go ahead.  

In some of these nations, of course, even though an independent commercial publishing industry existed, the internal security apparatus still influenced the book trade. Schindler recounts that

in Yugoslavia, which [although it was] the poor man’s Communism, it was in its own way quite tight. The secret police were everywhere, and everybody was very careful. Publishers would never talk to me alone. I called a publisher because I was hoping he would do something, and the guys always came with an assistant, usually a woman. He would never meet me alone, he would call in other people on the side. To make sure that the secret police knew nothing secret was being discussed. This is the way you had to operate. . . . I should know [if there was prior restraint censorship], but I don’t really [but] they had the kind of censorship where a journalist knows he can’t write about certain things, so, he exercises self-censorship. . . . He knows if he does it, he’ll end up in jail. I imagine that same kind of thinking occurred in Yugoslavia. The publishers were aware. If they wanted to translate John Steinbeck, they knew that was a pretty safe thing, no one was going to bother them. So they would go with John Steinbeck.

In most cases, once a desired title and publisher had been identified, the program officers (Franklin Steiner, Elizabeth McNaull, Howard Hill, and others) contacted the American rights-holder for a particular title, requesting the rights to that title for the language in question. In the request, the Books in Translation program would specify the number of copies to be published: for most of these titles, 2,000–3,000 copies was the norm. The publisher would receive a nominal rights fee, paid by the Books in Translation program ostensibly because the foreign publisher could not access dollars, and the author would receive his or her customary royalty. What seems at first like an unremarkable subsidiary-rights arrangement was in reality generously subsidized by the middlemen, the U.S. government. In addition to paying the rights fee, the Books in Translation program or USIA post would frequently agree to purchase, at cover price, a large number of the books, thus ensuring that the foreign publisher would break even before
selling a single copy on the open market. In other cases involving particularly desirable books or recalcitrant publishers, the United States would even provide the foreign publisher with a direct subsidy to cover production and distribution costs. This arrangement brought with it the danger that the local publisher might just “take the money and run,” and fail to put the books on the market as agreed, as Dan Lacy regretfully notes: “the publishers involved were too often concerned only with the government subsidy and not with any effective distribution of the titles published.”\(^50\) (Schindler indicates that in his personal experience this did, on occasion, happen.) On the other side, the rights fee paid to the American publisher was often quite paltry in comparison to similar arrangements for books in other languages, but it seems that publishers must have thought that $50 or $100 was more than they could have otherwise expected to glean from that title in Gujarati or Korean.

Unlike the books held in the Information Centers, the products of the Books in Translation program had their origins effaced. Such books, the State Department and USIA desired, would bear no trace of the fact that they existed because the U.S. foreign-policy establishment wanted them to. In the process of producing the book, the publisher and USIA took pains to ensure that it looked like any other book published by that firm for that market, and that the book itself could not attest to the U.S. government’s midwifing of it—even if that meant that the book, physically, was not up to American publishers’ standards. In fact, as Schindler put it in reference to one of his postings (New Delhi in the early 1960s), “because Indian publishing in certain [languages] was rather shoddy, some of the Americans would say, can’t you bring out a better package. And the answer was . . . we don’t want a product that looks different from the other books. So, it was just as shoddy as the other ones.”\(^51\)

Initially, selection of titles to be included in these programs was handled on a largely ad hoc basis by IIA staffers in Washington and officers in foreign missions, who presumably knew the target audience well enough to judge what books would be appropriate. But in late 1951, the Department of State—which, as the parent of ICS, already administered the reading rooms and their extensive holdings—moved to bring book professionals into the process of screening and selecting titles for the Information Centers, the IMG, and the translation programs. In 1951, the State Department convened an “Advisory Committee on Books Abroad” with a representative from the library field (Harland Carpenter of the Wilmington, Delaware, public library system), one from the nonprofit or academic publishing realm (Chester Kerr, the director of Yale University Press), and another from the for-profit publishing world (Robert L. Crowell, of the firm Thomas Y.
Crowell). The committee’s mission was to “advise concerning the policy for the selection and use overseas of books, periodicals, and other publications, in Info Centers, Binational Centers, Books in Translation program, English language teaching program, presentation of books and periodicals to foreign institutions, and other special projects; and to advise on problems in the publishing, literary, and other related professional fields.”52

Kerr and Crowell had both been in the Council on Books in Wartime and brought that perspective to the later program. In a 1951 letter (on stationery, echoing the Council’s slogan, inscribed BOOKS ARE WEAPONS IN THE WAR OF IDEAS) to the translations program, Crowell advised that they select “1 A worthy American novel. 2 A book which refutes the tenets of Stalinism. 3 A book which illuminates an important aspect of American life. 4 A biography of a well-known character. 5. A standard US classic. 6 A book from our history, preferably one that highlights the inherent significance of individual freedom in America’s progress.”53 Assumption that the program would take the form of State Department administrators coming to agreements with foreign publishers to publish selected American titles, often with the State Department paying the foreign rights fees and subsidizing the foreign publishers, Crowell reminded the project administrators of the book program that, in many nations, the booksellers ARE the publishers, and not to despair if they cannot find a suitable publisher. Making suggestions that were implemented almost verbatim by the program, Crowell added that the officer should negotiate contracts with publishers specifying print runs of at least 2,000–3,500 (3,500 is “minimum” in Western Europe), prices at or below the “prevailing prices for similar books. To induce the publisher to price an item below the usual level it may be necessary to increase the subsidy.”54 Crowell also made it clear that the U.S. officer should offer to purchase—at cover price—a significant number of copies from the publisher: 1,000 out of 3,500 is a ”frequent arrangement” in such programs, he added.55 In 1951, Carpenter, Crowell, and Kerr took an inspection tour of U.S. posts abroad with the intention of discovering what foreign audiences wanted from U.S. books, and how the ICS’s programs might be expanded. This advisory committee quickly set to work outlining selection criteria for titles, and met with groups such as the American Book Publishers Council and the American Library Association to present their findings and to ask advice—the American Book Publishers Council’s Committee on Reading Development and the American Library Association’s International Relations Board both expected an advisory role in the changing American book programs, in keeping with the State Department’s traditional welcoming attitude to the private sector in cultural diplomacy.
There were drawbacks in having the private sector drive the book programs, though. IMG facilitated the dissemination of American books abroad, and was grounded on the free-market ideology that underpinned all U.S. cultural diplomacy, but sometimes foreign markets had no demand for the products that the U.S. cultural diplomats most wanted to sell. Because of this, the State Department and USIA had to use the libraries and Information Centers and the Books in Translation program to select particular titles for foreign audiences. In this effort, the field agents of the embassies and consulates, and later of the USIA, collaborated with State Department officers and outside consultants to choose titles that would adequately, accurately, and positively represent the culture of the United States to foreign audiences. Childs and McNeil point out that the increasing output of the American book industry during the 1950s, as well, necessitated that USIA turn to outside consultants to help them choose appropriate titles: “an outside research organization . . . provide[d] the expertise of university professors and other specialists . . . thus [bringing] the title selection process into the academic community.”

As with the IMG program, the criteria by which such books were chosen grew stricter and much more directive over the course of the 1950s, when conservative elements in Congress aimed to root out all “Communist” or “subversive” materials from the Information Centers and libraries abroad and, in a larger sense, to extend Congress’s power over these book programs. In 1952, Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy demanded a list of the holdings of the overseas libraries in order to vet the authors included. The IIA responded with a directive to foreign-service officers stating that controversial authors could be included if the works in question supported the mission of positively presenting the United States to the world; McCarthy, though, wanted any author with questionable political affiliations rooted out. IIA revised its order in February 1953 and directed its librarians to remove materials by “any controversial persons, Communists, fellow travelers, ‘et cetera.’” As Louise S. Robbins points out in her comprehensive overview of this episode, this directive only confused the librarians and administrators, and further orders over the next several months “ranged from an order to destroy a 1946 issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* because it contained an article on the United Nations; to an order to remove individual issues of periodicals that contained material detrimental to U.S. objectives; to an order to remove works by authors who had claimed Fifth Amendment protection in testifying before congressional committees.” In April 1953, McCarthy associates Roy Cohn and David Schine toured reading rooms, reporting back to McCarthy that the holdings were rife with books by Commu-
nists and with Communist-leaning material. Nervous ICS librarians pulled from the shelves books by Communist-linked authors such as Howard Fast, Lillian Hellman, Dashiell Hammett, and even W. E. B. Du Bois. But in July 1953, after the American Library Association, the American Book Publishers Council, the Intellectual Freedom Conference, and even President Eisenhower expressed their opposition to what they characterized as the “book burners” at home and abroad, the IIA felt confident enough to revise its guidelines again, reinstating content-based criteria (although specifying that works by “avowed Communists” had to be “clearly useful for the special purposes of the program”). Still, many of the proscribed titles reflect the paranoia of the times and the caution of the program’s administrators: Theodore Dreiser’s classic novels *Sister Carrie* and *An American Tragedy* were pulled from the shelves, as were all works by and about Ezra Pound (who was incarcerated in an asylum awaiting trial on a treason charge) and, most surprisingly, two books on Thomas Paine (Philip Foner’s edition of *The Complete Writings*, and Fast’s historical novel *Citizen Tom Paine*). Osgood argues that, ironically, the McCarthy campaign revitalized the book programs by “reestablishing books as critical weapons in the war of ideas.”

In 1961 the standards about what works would be included in the translations program or covered by IMG changed yet again. “Materials to be covered,” the USIA specified in a form letter about IMG to American publishers, “must make a positive contribution in support of US policy objectives and must reflect favorably on the United States. Heretofore the rule applied was that materials not inconsistent with the national interest were eligible for coverage.” The archive of the Alfred A Knopf company provides an interesting window on what books the Department of State and USIA thought to be valuable for its programs—and, by extension, for the particular picture of the United States that the State Department wanted to disseminate abroad. Alfred A. Knopf was, by the 1950s, easily America’s preeminent literary publisher. Founded in 1915 and at the height of its influence at midcentury, the publishing house, which bore its founder’s name, embodied the American literary establishment in the publishing world while also bringing daring, even experimental foreign writers to the American market. (It would be sold to Random House in 1960, where it is still an imprint.) Knopf himself was an active participant in many USIA programs (as well as a director of the nongovernmental Intercultural Publications project), and his company licensed many of its books to be translated and sold abroad under the Books in Translation program. In July 1960, for instance, Knopf was informed that it could sell Serbo-Croatian language rights to Dashiell Hammett’s *The Thin Man*. Hammett had been a target of McCarthy’s
investigation into the IIA’s libraries and reading rooms in 1952 and 1953, and his works were briefly pulled, but because his books were neither lewd, salacious, nor anti-United States, they had been considered acceptable since 1953. However, only two weeks after the 1961 policy change, USIA told Knopf that Hammett’s *Maltese Falcon* “does not qualify for sale of publication rights under IMG. This decision is based on the new criteria being applied to all materials submitted for inclusion under IMG.”

USIA’s new guidelines for IMG, many publishers believed, were applied haphazardly and with no seeming logic, as in the case of the American writer John Updike. The USIA had specifically requested to include Updike’s work—short stories, mostly—in several different USIA media projects (magazines, books, radio) in 1961 and 1962, but in 1963 IMG turned down Knopf’s request for IMG coverage of a work that was to become one of the keystone American novels of the postwar period: Updike’s *Rabbit, Run*. Knopf’s Thomas Lowry, baffled and irritated that USIA rejected *Rabbit, Run* even as it was requesting Knopf’s permission to use material from Updike’s story “Alligators” in a Voice of America broadcast and was publishing a collection of Updike’s stories for Polish publication, asked Knopf, “do you want to raise a loud cry with anyone in Washington about IMG’s disapproval of RABBIT, RUN?” but Knopf demurred. (Updike continued to appear in USIA-sponsored media through the 1960s, and was even sent to the Soviet Union on behalf of the State Department in 1964.)

One of the first books the USIA promoted, and one that it continued to translate and publish and promote well into the 1960s, was Gordon Dean’s *Report on the Atom*, which Knopf published in 1953. A central public-diplomacy initiative of Eisenhower’s first term was the “Atoms for Peace” program, intended to counter the image of the United States as a nuclear aggressor and recast American atomic might as a shared scientific achievement destined to improve the lives of the world’s inhabitants. Dean, who had served as chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission from 1950 to 1953, wrote his book as a calming explanation to the world of American intentions regarding nuclear power and its use in destructive weaponry. “At no time,” he insists, “did anyone in a position of responsibility suggest that ‘now that we have the bomb exclusively, let us go out and conquer the world.’ The United States has never thought in such terms, and it did not think in such terms at the conclusion of World War II.” In fact, he concludes, it is the United States’ democratic structure that will prevent it from pursuing such hegemonic aims. This does not mean, though, that the United States will shirk its responsibilities in maintaining international stability: “Unless a real and secure peace can be achieved, we have no choice
but to remain strong in the hope that a hand of a potential aggressor will be stayed by the threat of absolute retaliation before he makes the irrevo-
cable move." In January 1954, B. Franklin Steiner (the acting chief of the Translations Branch) wrote William Koshland of Alfred A. Knopf, noting that USIA wanted to “stimulate the translation and publication abroad” of and to condense Dean’s book, offering to buy world translation rights to the title. Koshland initially deferred, noting that Knopf wanted to sell the foreign rights to the book itself, but by December 1954 he relented, and over the next two years the USIA put out the book in seventeen languages—especially those languages spoken in nations either nonaligned (Malaysia, Indonesia, India) or breaking away from the Soviet orbit (Yugoslavia). At the same time, USIA also arranged the translation of a children’s book on the same topic—John Lewellen’s *The Mighty Atom*—for distribution in India and Yugoslavia. Dean’s and Lewellen’s books both meshed cleanly with the rhetoric of “Atoms for Peace.”

Predictably, many of the titles that USIA sought to publish abroad or to add to Information Center/reading room shelves attacked Communism or the Soviet Union. Polemic anti-Communist tracts popular among conservative readers in the United States were largely absent, as the target audience for these books was presumably not susceptible to crude Red-baiting. Instead, anti-Communism came in more subtle but still emphatic flavors: Czeslaw Milosz’s *Captive Mind*—written by a left-leaning poet who had worked for the Polish Communist government until defecting in 1951—attacked the lack of intellectual freedom in the Communist world without the hysterical tone of many domestic anti-Communist publications, and Richard Crossman’s anthology *The God That Failed* (translated into Greek, Indonesian, Hindi, Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, Tagalog, Turkish, and Gujarati) collected bitter reminiscences of the Communist movement from former participants Arthur Koestler, Richard Wright, Stephen Spender, Andre Gide, Ignazio Silone, and Louis Fischer. Some of the anti-Communism was literary: Koestler’s *Darkness at Noon* fictionalized imprisonment in a Communist police state and was translated into about half of the languages used by the program, while Orwell’s *Animal Farm* appeared in almost every language into which USIA translated books, and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was also distributed. These books, authored by prominent figures in the literary and cultural worlds, linked anti-Communism to a vibrant cultural and intellectual life, drawing upon some of the leading names in the Western cultural scene (many of whom, including Silone, Spender, Milosz, and Koestler, were active in anti-Communist movements such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom).
Other anti-Communist books translated into local languages—or at times secretly commissioned from local authors—made “behind-the-scenes-of-Communism” exposé arguments and focused on the most sordid and ominous aspects of Communism: slave labor camps, foreign dupes, interrogations, and prisons. Interestingly, some national markets received many more such titles than others. Solely in 1953, for instance, USIA produced Italian versions of Dallin’s *New Soviet Empire*, Griffith’s *Communism in Action*, Herling’s *The Soviet Slave Empire*, Lipper’s *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*, Hyde’s *I Believed: The Autobiography of a Former British Communist*, and Riley and Schramm’s *The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul*, while essentially no explicitly anti-Communist works appear on the extensive lists of books translated into German that year for the German (sixty titles) or Austrian (twenty-five titles) markets. By far the greatest number and variety of anti-Communist volumes were produced and translated for and distributed in Chinese markets. Attacks on the Soviets that had appeared in several other nations were on this list—Beck and Godin’s *The Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession* or Lipper’s *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*—but remarkable here are the number of books that were not translations of English works but were produced specifically (with their USIA origins concealed) for Chinese readers: an entire series entitled *How the Chinese Communists Treat . . .* had titles on religion, merchants and industrialists, overseas Chinese, farmers, students, and several other subjects, and dozens of other harshly anti-Communist titles were translated into Chinese for readers in Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Hong Kong.

While anti-Communist titles jump out, the majority of books reflect the culturalist influence on cultural diplomacy, and dozens of credible, even-handed studies of American culture and history appear. In keeping with the Schlesingerian “Vital Center” understanding of the strengths of American culture and of its role in the world, the portrait of the United States offered by these books is unfailingly liberal and melioristic: we are a nation that had a special kind of origin (but we are not the “Shining City on the Hill”); our democracy is energized by the reasonable exchange of views among responsible citizens; our artistic and literary heritage is strong and distinctive; we are not without problems but are using that democracy to improve ourselves. The competing forces of society are not, as in the Marxist arguments the Soviet books presented to foreign audiences, in implacable conflict; instead, they negotiate and compromise in the common enterprise of a better America. In these books, we are evolving toward greater prosperity and equality, which will come from cooperative enterprise between the races, between the
market and the regulators, between labor and management, between the social classes. Typical of these arguments was Frank Tannenbaum’s *Philosophy of Labor*, which argued that trade unionism was a crucial stabilizing social force in contemporary industrial society, and Frederick Lewis Allen’s *The Big Change: America Transforms Itself* 1900–1950, which granted that the late nineteenth century had indeed been a time of inequality, injustice, and class conflict, but that the democratic political system and lightly regulated capitalism of the United States brought the freedom and prosperity of the postwar period. (Allen’s book appeared in essentially every language represented in the Books in Translation program.) The strategy behind these choices of books was to refute the idea, held by many leftists in the target audience and not coincidentally bolstered by Soviet books, that the United States was a cruel society whose very structure ensured that those with the power—corporations, the wealthy, whites, Christians—would continue to dominate. Without going so far as to portray the United States as a social-democratic state, these books attempted to dispel the harsh image of America held by many abroad. Ironically, although many of these books extol the free-market philosophy that was a key point of the “ideology of freedom,” U.S. book programs provide an especially well documented example of free-market rhetoric that came to audiences through heavy government intervention. While U.S. book programs never compared to the undertakings of the Soviets in terms of top-down, government direction, the U.S. government, giving the lie to the free-market rhetoric it sought to disseminate, did subsidize, facilitate, and underwrite the publication of many books arguing against excessive government involvement in the markets.

The books also sought to counter the widespread reputation of the United States as anti-intellectual. Many of the Knopf books (such as Learned Hand’s *Spirit of Liberty*, Carleton Coon’s *Story of Man*, and *Adventures of the Mind*, a 1959 anthology of pieces from the *Saturday Evening Post* by authors such as Jacques Barzun, Aaron Copland, Paul Tillich, Edith Hamilton, and J. Robert Oppenheimer “exploring the frontiers of contemporary thought”) had intellectual pretensions even if they rarely went beyond the middlebrow, and even those best sellers included were not the “trash” feared by legislators but rather books like Benjamin Thomas’s 1952 biography *Abraham Lincoln*, which had scholarly credibility but was on the best-seller lists for months, saw 100,000 copies of the first edition printed, and was praised almost unanimously for its “literary craftsmanship, [its] succinct but evocative style, [its] skill with words—almost reminiscent of Lincoln’s.” Thomas’s was one of the most widely translated books, and the Books in Translation program arranged for its publication across Europe,
the Middle East, and central and east Asia. Other Knopf titles requested by the State Department and USIA eschewed middlebrow appeal entirely and were clearly aimed at intellectuals and specialists in the fields of sociology, history, or education: Robin M. Williams’s *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, Carl Bridenbaugh’s *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743–1776*, and Arthur Breston’s *The Restoration of Learning*.

While European literary critics had always taken seriously a few American writers, such as Poe, most European intellectuals did not hold American literature in high esteem. In response, the USIA book programs, by design or not, forwarded a “canon” of classic American literature and offered critical works explaining where American literature drew upon, and where it diverged from, the Anglo-European tradition. In this, the book programs pursued a markedly different path than cultural-artistic groups such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom or Intercultural Publications, which tended to ignore the past and instead focus on contemporary experimental works in the transatlantic modernist vein. Favored literary titles for USIA were almost evenly distributed between older American classics by Twain, Hawthorne, Dickinson, Henry James, and Melville, and contemporary titles (particularly novels) that were middlebrow best sellers, of regionalist interest, or safely realist. Monthly circulars from 1951 listing books “selected for distribution to US Information Centers” are heavy on writers such as Willa Cather, William Dean Howells, and even Henry James; F. Scott Fitzgerald appears to be acceptable (both his works and criticism on his works are included), but Hemingway is not, although several of Hemingway’s books (*The Sun Also Rises, The Old Man and the Sea, A Farewell to Arms*, but not *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, which presumably was not hostile enough to Communism) did appear after 1954 in the Books in Translation program. (Works by and about Ezra Pound were explicitly forbidden in all programs after 1953.) Frequently appearing in the translation program were realist novels of light social criticism such as those by Sara Orne Jewett and Edith Wharton. By the early 1960s, books officers and other cultural diplomats had begun to think that their arguments about the importance of American literature had been successful, or had at least contributed to a general evolution of European critical opinion. One USIA program officer gleefully noted, in the early 1960s, “the eagerness with which foreign readers seize on the books of William Faulkner and Ernest Hemingway—does anyone now remember that once an English critic asked, ‘Who reads an American book?’”

The selection of literary titles from one national market to another did not differ to the same dramatic extent as did the selection of books about Communism, but the variation reflected American policy priorities as well
as, certainly, the predilections and personalities of the local books officer. In
the period 1950–56, the Chinese, German, Greek, Japanese, Korean, and
Portuguese markets saw the greatest number of total titles, but literature
played very different roles from market to market. The sixty-nine titles on
the Greek list, for example, are heavy on literature, and in 1953 the USIA
compiled and translated into Greek two collections of American short sto-
ries, as well. By contrast, the over 200-title Chinese list (for distribution in
two main markets, Hong Kong and “Formosa,” although a few Chinese
titles were distributed in Singapore and one in the Philippines) is extreme-
ly thin on literature: from 1953 to 1956 only seven books that might be
classed as serious American literature were distributed in Chinese through
the State Department or USIA. Certainly the greater cultural commonality
between Greece and the United States accounts in part for this difference,
but more important was the political difference: Greek Communism in the
mid-1950s was a tenacious oppositional movement, but its goals of gov-
ernance had been thwarted, while the Chinese in Taiwan and Hong Kong
presumably needed their anti-Communist determination energized after the
Communists’ 1949 takeover of the mainland. Finally, the books selected
for the German market at times did triple duty: explaining U.S. culture and
society, attacking Communism, and continuing the process of denazification
that had begun with Overseas Editions. Books chosen for that final purpose
include Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, John Hersey’s novel
The Wall (about the Jewish uprising in Nazi-occupied Warsaw), The Story
of the Trapp Family Singers (distributed in Austria but, interestingly, not in
Germany), and two books on Hans Gropius and the Bauhaus movement,
deemed degenerate by the Nazis.

In a rare departure from Schlesinger’s argument, few works of modern-
ist or experimental literature or related criticism appear on the translations
lists. Schlesinger argued that modernist art and literature were evidence
of Western freedom, particularly in modernist art—“the paintings of Pi-
casso, the music of Stravinsky”—because its ambiguity and strangeness
can only be appreciated by free individuals. A few undeniably modernist
titles and authors were translated: Malcolm Lowry’s Under the Volcano
was brought out in German in 1952, Marianne Moore’s Collected Poems
appeared in German in 1954, and Hemingway’s “Snows of Kilimanjaro,”
Fitzgerald’s “Babylon Revisited,” and Faulkner’s “Rose for Emily” were
widely reprinted in USIA-produced anthologies, particularly in Asian lan-
guages. Faulkner’s books were well represented in the translation program,
most likely because of his willingness to appear at conferences and speaking
tours abroad on behalf of USIA, but publicity materials sent out for those
tours tended to paint Faulkner not as an experimentalist but as a Southern realist or regionalist. The absence of anything by Wallace Stevens, William Carlos Williams, Gertrude Stein, or Hart Crane strikes us today as notable, although less remarkable is the lack of prominent American modernists such as John Dos Passos, Clifford Odets, or Langston Hughes (because of their earlier Communist associations) or, of course, Pound. Some translated critical works such as Frederick Hoffman’s *The Modern American Novel* or William Van O’Connor’s *An Age of Criticism* did deal directly with modernism, but downplayed the importance of the artistic experimentation that most critics of the time saw as modernism’s most important feature—and that groups such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom insisted were the fruits of freedom. One critical work that argued for modernism’s importance, F. O. Matthiessen’s *Responsibilities of the Critic*, was actually put on a proscribed list in 1953, presumably because of accusations that Matthiessen was a Communist.

It seems ironic that a project tasked with countering European assumptions that the United States was an artistic backwater included so little of the most important and most internationally respected recent American writing, especially at a time when international modernism in literature and the other arts was at its apex of influence and prestige. This oversight, or shortsightedness, is especially notable given that other cultural-diplomacy efforts foregrounded America’s leadership in artistic modernism: 1947’s traveling “Advancing American Art” exhibition featured abstract expressionist paintings, and through the 1950s several other USIA-organized exhibitions and tours focused on America’s embrace of modernist design and architecture and music, even though Truman, Eisenhower, and influential congressmen such as George Dondero personally disliked experimental art. The book program, as well, included titles celebrating American experimentation in other arts, such as Gerd Hatje’s *American Architecture since 1947*, Rudi Blesch’s *Modern Art USA: Men, Rebellion, Conquest 1900–1950*, and Barry Ulanov’s *History of Jazz in America*, even as experimental modernist literature was largely ignored. Experimental literature, it seems, here fell victim to the timidity of the book program’s administrators, made fearful by the suspicion and surveillance initiated by McCarthy and perpetuated by other conservatives in Congress.

The USIA and its predecessor agencies were as sensitive to portrayals of the American racial situation as they were to the inclusion of modernist literature or to books by Communist-sympathizing authors. Communist propaganda, both Soviet and homegrown, had long pointed to the hypocritical disjunction of the United States’ rhetoric of freedom and its Jim Crow
social and legal structures. In response, the IIA/USIA chose to respond not by confronting Communist accusations directly—what could they say?—but by making available positive portrayals of race relations in America. As early as 1951, a “Memo on Book Translation Programs” sent out to Foreign Service posts recommended that officers seek to arrange the translation and foreign publication of such positive portrayals of the American racial situation as Margery Miller’s *Joe Louis: American*, Bill Roeder’s *Jackie Robinson*, Augusta Stevenson’s *Booker T. Washington: Ambitious Boy* and *George Washington Carver: Boy Scientist*, and Catherine Owens Peare’s biography of the African-American educator Mary McLeod Bethune. In 1953, responding to Congressional complaints that the portrayal of a warts-and-all America overseas was counterproductive, a State Department staff member noted that “the presence of [Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944] *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* . . . impressed readers abroad with the ‘credibility of the material.’”76 Carman, Syrett, and Wishy’s *History of the American People*, a Knopf title included in the translations program in 1957, forcefully refuted the widespread idea that Reconstruction, and its enfranchisement of black voters, was a disaster visited upon Southern society. In 1962, the USIA recommended that reading rooms and libraries order Bernard Taper’s book *Gomillion versus Lightfoot: The Tuskegee Gerrymander Case*, an “analysis of the difficulties over Tuskegee township boundaries which disenfranchised the Negro vote and ends with the Supreme Court decision against such blatant discrimination.”77 For the most part, treatment of this issue echoed the American liberal stance: this is an injustice, but the structures of a democracy can, and inevitably will, ameliorate it. Not all realistic visions of American race relations were acceptable, though. In 1953, the Book and Library Program removed from its shelves Herbert Aptheker’s *Documentary History of the Negro People in the U.S.*, and the writer and historian Dorothy Sterling reports that her book *Tender Warriors*, “a picture and text report of the unbelievably brave young people who were walking through screaming mobs to go to [newly integrated] school[s],” was “disapproved for export” under IMG in 1958, with no reason ever given.78

The prominent inclusion of William Faulkner in the cultural-diplomacy program also caused complications because of his close association with the state of Mississippi and the heritage of the American South, but USIA saw Faulkner as an invaluable asset because of the great respect European and Latin American audiences had for his writing. Moreover, Faulkner had stressed USIA’s favorite theme—people’s eternal desire for freedom—in his famed Nobel speech in 1950.79 Faulkner’s books were widely translated
and distributed through the Books in Translation program, but beginning in 1954 Faulkner also started traveling abroad as a “United States Specialist” for the USIA, initially to a conference in Sao Paolo, Brazil, and then to Japan, the Philippines, and Italy in 1955, Greece in 1957, and Venezuela in 1961. USIA attempted to deflect any possible attacks on Faulkner by foreign audiences by sending out publicity materials that included a transcript of a laudatory radio discussion about Faulkner between Irving Howe and “negro novelist” Ralph Ellison. Faulkner aided in USIA’s project to cleanse him of the taint of Mississippi racism when, in 1955, he strongly condemned the murder of Emmett Till while on his Italian trip and lamented the state of American race relations on a stop in Iceland.

A great deal of work remains to be done on this topic. Although I have been able to unearth archival materials from the government, from publishers, and from groups such as the American Library Association, some key information has yet to surface. Much Cold War–era documentation of the internal workings of these programs is still classified, and the Obama administration’s expressed desire to revive President Clinton’s opening of national-security archives is being implemented slowly. Internal communications from the ICS and Translations Office are unavailable, and I am still attempting to identify the “outside consultants” to the book programs that Childs and McNeil mention. Investigations of other publishers’ archives could shed more light on what publishers thought about this program. Furthermore, this examination entirely ignores the reception side of the equation—how foreign populations viewed and used the books provided to them. Such research would include the internal State Department and USIA briefs to policy makers, but would also have to touch upon the literary, intellectual, and political worlds of targeted nations.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project did not exist in the 1950s, and it would be difficult to quantify the degree to which that era’s earnest, if excessively conservative, approach to the shaping of world opinion actually succeeded. But it seems undeniable at one level that books worked: that for decades the United States was able to moderate, if not fully counteract, the hard-todeny global impression that it is an imperialist power, using commercial and military means to achieve hegemony. Certainly, it was easy to seem acceptable when the alternative—Soviet Communism—was so dire, but it seems undeniable that American willingness, and even eagerness, to use books and ideas as weapons went some distance to prove its, and the West’s, fundamental valuation of intellectual openness and inquiry, of individual freedom. In his contribution to The God That Failed, the British poet Stephen Spender attacked Communist epistemology, in which “experience could only be drawn
on in order to illustrate an aspect of a foregone conclusion, arrived at independently of the experience.” The intellectual life of the West, he believed (and, through his editorship of the Congress for Cultural Freedom’s magazine Encounter, argued), was open to genuine inquiry. The United States’ use of books, and the principled work of hundreds of anonymous State Department and USIA bureaucrats and librarians, supports Spender’s contentions. Certainly there were nonsensical constraints put upon intellectual freedom at times in the USIA, and certainly the materials disseminated and stocked by the USIA stacked the intellectual deck, sometimes dishonestly, in the United States’ favor. But the now-dusty, out-of-date books used in these book programs are impressive in just how propagandistic and slanted they could easily have been, but are not.

Note


5. Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 289, 298.


8. Ibid., 193–94.


15. USC 22, Chapter 18, Subchapter I, P. 1437.


22. Ibid., 185.

23. Ibid., 173.


27. “Soviet Book Publishing in Free World Languages,” State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Report, 1961, Box 206, Folder 11, Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Archive, Special Collections Library, University of Arkansas–Fayetteville.


29. For a fuller description of Franklin Publications, see Laugesen, “Books for the World.”


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32. Curtis G. Benjamin, *U.S. Books Abroad: Neglected Ambassadors* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1984), 89. Apart from Germany, Yugoslavia, and Poland, many other Western European nations initially had IMG programs, but those were largely ended by 1955, likely because currency convertibility ceased to be a problem.


38. NARA, Record Group 306, Entry A1 6, Lot no. 70 D 423, Box 40, “IMG Legislative History” folder.


43. Ibid., 19-20.

44. The case history of Franklin Books is in some ways an even more striking demonstration of the marshaling of literature for political purposes, but Franklin’s operations were aimed primarily at Middle Eastern audiences, and thus it falls outside of the scope of my investigation.


49. Ibid.


51. Schindler, personal interview.

52. Memo from Dan Lacy, Information Center Division, to “Mr. Johnstone,” October 8, 1951, NARA Record Group 306 Entry A1 6, Lot no. 70 D 423, Box 147, “Advisory Committee on Books Abroad” folder.

53. Robert Crowell, memo to Translation Program, IIA, Department of State, August 6, 1951, NARA Record Group 306 (General Records of the USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files), Box 174.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Childs and McNeil, *American Books Abroad*, 184. I have as of yet been unable to unearth the papers of this “research organization,” or even identify it, but clearly looking into its internal papers would yield a wealth of information on the criteria behind title selection.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., 32–33; Memo, International Informational Administration, to diplomatic and consular officers, July 15, 1953, NARA Record Group 306 (General Records of the USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files), Box 177.

60. Osgood, Total Cold War, 296.

61. USIA to Alfred A Knopf, October 11, 1961, Box 301, Folder 6, Alfred A. Knopf Archive (hereafter cited as AAK), Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin.


63. USIA to William Koshland, July 22, 1960, Box 301, Folder 6, AAK.

64. USIA to Thomas Lowry, October 26, 1961, Box 301, Folder 6, AAK.

65. Thomas Lowry to John Updike, August 28, 1963, Box 301, Folder 6, AAK. Knopf had received a request from a Yugoslav firm to publish the novel in Serbo-Croatian.


67. William Koshland to Franklin Steiner, Translations Branch, USIA, January 6, 1954, Box 160, Folder 2, AAK; Steiner to Koshland, December 12, 1954, Box 160, Folder 2, AAK; Koshland to Elizabeth McNaul, Translations Branch, USIA, January 18, 1957, Box 222, Folder 2, AAK.

68. Information about the books included in the translation program comes from United States Information Agency, Books Published Abroad July 1, 1950–June 30, 1956.

69. See especially Schlesinger, Vital Center.


72. Mary Stewart French (head of Community Groups Unit, Office of Educational Exchange, Department of State), “The Arts and the Educational Exchange Program” (report), 1961(?), Box 47, Folder 18, Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Archive, Special Collections Library, University of Arkansas–Fayetteville.

73. Box 144, Folder 13, Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Archive, Special Collections Library, University of Arkansas–Fayetteville.

74. “List of books USIA will not procure unless directed to do so by State Department,” 1953, NARA Record Group 306, Box 177, “Finnish War Program” folder.

75. On the use of modernist art in American traveling exhibitions, and the congressional and popular backlash against it, see Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters.


77. United States Information Agency memo, “Current Books Recommended for USIS,” April 16, 1962, Box 59, Folder 8, AAK.

79. In fact, the public affairs officer of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs took credit for persuading Faulkner to travel to Stockholm to accept the award, writing that he had “finally made [the trip] at last because he had been convinced that it was in the interests of the United States cultural relations that he do so.” Philip Raine, ARA/P, to Mr. Riley of the International Education Programs, June 22, 1954, Box 144, Folder 13, Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Archive, Special Collections Library, University of Arkansas–Fayetteville.

80. Transcript of radio discussion between Howe, Ellison, and Lyman Bryson, Box 144, Folder 13, Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Archive, Special Collections Library, University of Arkansas–Fayetteville.