International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1993

The Cold War Conception of Nuclear Reality: Mobilizing the American Imagination for Nuclear War in the 1950's

Guy Oakes

THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR REALITY

During World War II, the United States was not occupied like Europe, invaded like the Soviet Union, or bombed like Great Britain. Nor was there any plausible suggestion that the home front might be subjected to any of these acts of war. As a result, it has been said that Americans were obliged to fight the war at a distance and "on imagination alone."[1] Within months of V-J day, civil defense strategists began to make plans to mobilize the American public for World War III. By the late 1940's, these plans included preparations for a Soviet nuclear strike against the United States. Thus Cold War civil defense planning posed the much more daunting problem of fighting an imaginary war.

By 1950, the American foreign policy objective of containing what was perceived to be an otherwise irresistible expansion of Soviet power was tied to the strategy of nuclear deterrence. If the Soviets threatened war, the United States would guarantee the peace, if necessary by nuclear retaliation. As students of the early Cold War have stressed for some years, this strategy rested on domestic presuppositions. It was necessary to mobilize the American home front in order to sustain what President Kennedy later called "a long twilight struggle" in support of a new conception of national security. In the nuclear age, the project of securing American national interests would be interminable in principle, unprecedentedly expensive, and uniquely dangerous. The military, economic, and political requirements of Cold War mobilization have received considerable attention. However, it has not been generally appreciated that the policy of containment by means of nuclear deterrence also rested on moral presuppositions. Above all, this strategy was based on the assumption that the

American people would be willing to assume the risks and demonstrate the resolve necessary to fight a nuclear war.

The importance of the credibility of deterrence is a staple of the strategic literature. For deterrence to succeed, it was necessary for the Soviets to believe that the United States would make good on its nuclear threat. Thus the means to make this threat credible had to be in place. The quite different problem of the domestic credibility of deterrence has not received commensurate attention. Acceptance of deterrence by the American people as an admissible means of achieving national security depended on the credibility of the view that even if deterrence failed, the consequences would still be tolerable. Otherwise, the American resolve to fight a nuclear war could not be expected to hold. Thus it was necessary to maintain that even if the American threat to counter Soviet provocations by employing atomic bombs led the Soviets to respond in kind, the results would not be catastrophic. In the rhetoric of the time, if the price of freedom proved to be nuclear war, even this price was not too high.

Americans would learn to tolerate the dangers of deterrence and embrace the risks of nuclear war only if they could be persuaded that the effects of a nuclear attack on their own cities would not be too costly. This conviction depended on a demonstration that, at a minimum, they would survive such an attack, and, following a reasonable period of reconstruction, return to the familiar rounds of their pre-attack lives. The instrument chosen to produce this demonstration was civil defense. The civil defense program of the 1950's was based on the premise of survival through self-reliance. Americans would be trained to protect themselves in a nuclear assault.[2]

But what did such an assault hold in store for the American people? This question posed the problem of how the theater of World War III — American society under nuclear bombardment — should be envisioned. Within what conceptual framework should the world of nuclear attack be imagined? The basic premise of civil defense as self-protection presupposed a distinctive picture of nuclear war in America, a specific ontology of the attack and post-attack world. This conception of nuclear reality would convince the public that survival by means of self-protection was actually possible. Thus even if deterrence failed, the results would not be disastrous.

The preferred conception of nuclear reality would demonstrate that Americans were capable of confronting a nuclear emergency through their own efforts. Its aim was not to provide a detailed picture of American society devastated by nuclear weapons, but to represent an "ideal" nuclear world: a vision of the United States under nuclear bombardment showing that the American people could meet the challenges of nuclear war. Civil

defense planners produced what was needed: the Cold War conception of nuclear reality, an interpretation of American society under nuclear attack designed to sustain the view that in World War III, Americans would make the best of the worst. Ordinary citizens, properly trained and prepared, would manage their own survival.

Given appropriate responses by the public, World War III would produce no irreversible, or even significant, changes in the American scene. American institutions and practices would remain in place. After the nuclear emergency was successfully negotiated, everyday life would resume as if nothing had happened. The post-attack world would be governed by the values and the logic of the pre-attack world. American society in the 1950's might experience some perturbations in the hiatus caused by World War III, and business as usual might be interrupted. However, civil defense would call for no basic revisions or radical alterations in the American way of life, the principles of which would be translated in toto into the post-war world without any loss of force or validity.

The Cold War conception of nuclear reality was the product of a single master narrative. The world of nuclear attack envisioned by civil defense theorists was represented as an ensemble of technical problems, intimidating to be sure, but thoroughly manageable by local communities and individual households trained in civil defense procedures. Americans would survive a nuclear attack through planning, training and discipline. As a result, they would achieve the self-reliance and self-preparedness required to meet the ultimate test of national and personal survival.

CRISIS MASTERY

National security strategists represented the Soviet nuclear threat as a crisis in American life, the first time in modern military history that the American people would be directly exposed to the dangers of warfare. The primary target of a Soviet nuclear offensive would not be the armed forces of the United States, but its economic and political infrastructure and, above all, its people, on whom the will to respond to the attack, wage nuclear war, and rebuild the country depended. What was the character of this crisis?

In response to this question, the architects of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality developed an interpretation of nuclear attack as an event that could be controlled by careful planning and good management. True, millions of people would die. Millions more would be injured, their property would be destroyed, and they would be left homeless. The level of death and destruction would be especially high in large cities and centers of industry and communications. But regardless

of how terrible the consequences might be, they would not mean the end of the American nation.

Thus a nuclear crisis was understood not as an incomprehensible and overwhelming catastrophe, to which its potential victims could respond only with awe and terror, a technologically produced national disaster to be suffered and, if fate decreed, endured. On the contrary, it was an event over which Americans could exercise substantial control by making careful and systematic preparations. The crisis was conceived not primarily by reference to the potential destruction it could wreck on American life, but by reference to the conditions of its mastery. A nuclear attack was made comprehensible by representing it as the object of a plan. The purpose of the plan was to manage the nuclear crisis in order to insure the survival of the American people and preserve the structure and values of American society intact. Because plans for nuclear crisis mastery would be carried out by the public, and not by a small cadre of professional experts, their execution was regarded as a matter of simple pragmatics: the application of easily acquired techniques that could be learned by anyone willing to devote the necessary time and effort to civil defense training. Thus the problems posed by a nuclear attack were fully commensurable with the conceptual apparatus of American culture and amenable to a resolution by employing its stock strategies and procedures.

The conception of a nuclear attack as a problem of planning entailed that survival would be reduced to a set of routines. A nuclear crisis would represent only an incremental and quantitative deviation from the norms of American life, not a qualitative disruption or transformation. Nuclear crisis mastery was not an attempt to escape the world of nuclear attack. On the contrary, it was an effort to integrate this world into the mundane reality of American life. The basic character of American society would remain unchanged even in a nuclear war. In the fantasy of nuclear crisis mastery, the prospect of a nuclear assault on the United States was neither evaded, denied, or nullified. It was translated into everyday life by methods that were held to be institutionalized features of this life: systematic planning and the careful execution of plans by means of do-it-yourself techniques. The project of normalizing a nuclear attack reinforced the legitimacy of core American values. Their validity was demonstrated even under exceptional and marginal conditions that were barely imaginable before the advent of nuclear weapons.

The enterprise that articulated the objectives, assumptions, and methods of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality most completely was Project East River. A study of American civil defense commissioned and completed during the Truman administration, the *Project East River Report*

was quickly acknowledged as the canonical text of nuclear crisis mastery and the "Bible of civil defense."[3]

Project East River was undertaken by "Associated Universities Inc." at the request of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), and the Department of Defense. Associated Universities was an early Cold War think tank sponsored by several Ivy League universities — Cornell, Columbia, Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale — as well as Johns Hopkins, MIT, and the University of Rochester. Negotiations for a contract with Associated Universities for the purpose of civil defense research were initiated by the Army Signal Corps on June 27, 1951. The first policy meeting to plan Project East River was held on August 1, 1951 at the office of Associated Universities in New York. Recruitment of research personnel began on August 15. Participants were recruited from member and other universities as well as from government, business, and industry. All Project East River personnel met for the first time for a three-day planning session in New York on November 26-28, 1951.[4]

The objective of Project East River was to develop concrete proposals and programs that would enable the federal government to prepare the country for a nuclear attack. The contract between Associated Universities and the Signal Corps specified that Project East River would produce research tailored to the needs of three government agencies: the FCDA, which was responsible for planning how to protect the American public from nuclear attack; the NSRB, which was responsible for advising the President on the relocation of industries and services essential to national security and for making plans to ensure the continuous functioning of the federal government under a nuclear attack; and the Department of Defense, which was responsible for assisting the FCDA and the NSRB.

On the one hand, the *Project East River Report* made a point of not underestimating the gravity of the Soviet nuclear threat. The American victory in World War II did not promise a generation of peace and prosperity. On the contrary, it marked the beginning of the most dangerous period in American history. The world had entered a "perilous atomic era."[5] Those who rested their hopes for a better world on an early resolution of the Cold War labored under an illusion. Project East River stressed that Americans had seriously underestimated the dangers a possible nuclear attack posed to their national security. "An attack with modern weapons would be much more damaging to our population, our property, our way of life, and to our democratic institutions generally than is realized by the public or even by many responsible government officials.[6] The novel dangers of nuclear weapons were not due exclusively to their destructive

capacity. Unlike earlier weapons, their "most lucrative use" was not against military assets, but rather the industry, agriculture, and people of an adversary. This meant that in World War III, American homes and families would be a primary target of the Soviet nuclear strike force. The end of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons in the autumn of 1949 obviously reduced the relative military advantage these weapons gave the United States. In particular, it diminished their usefulness as a means of deterring attack by threatening retaliation. In the near future, increases in the Soviet nuclear stockpile would reach a critical mass, at which point the Soviets would be able to launch "a knockout, saturation attack against the United States." The absolute size of the American nuclear retaliatory force might still be larger than its Soviet counterpart. However, this factor alone would not be sufficient to deter the aggressive tendencies of the Soviets. The prospect of such an attack seemed so staggering that it produced a feeling of futility. Both the intellect and the imagination were overwhelmed by the "sheer magnitude of a problem so large, so complex, and so seemingly impossible of adequate and practical solution."[7]

On the other hand, the very fact that Project East River represented a nuclear attack not as a cosmic disaster, but as a problem — which had, at least in principle, a solution — indicated that this fatalistic response was unduly pessimistic. The situation was far from hopeless. The problem of protecting the economy, the institutions, and the people of the United States in a nuclear attack could be solved, but only through the construction of "a permanent civil defense system."[8] Surviving a nuclear attack was possible, but not without methodical plans and preparations. There was only one way to plan for a nuclear crisis: by using the concepts and tools of management. Manageability was the fundamental methodological concept of the Project East River program of nuclear crisis resolution. By employing this methodology, a nuclear attack was defined as a problem, the various facets of which were subdivided and reformulated as practical tasks. A nuclear attack was understood as a system that could be exhaustively analyzed into its component parts. Each part could be subjected to further analysis and broken down into its component elements, until the level of analysis arrived at problems for which manageable solutions could be framed. When that stage of planning was reached, the problem of nuclear crisis management was solved.

> When civil defense is broken down into small parts, it is then possible to do something effective about each part within practical limits of time and economy. When each of the individual accomplishments has been added to the total picture, the results are impressive.[9]

This strategy of subjecting a nuclear attack to systematic analysis in order to develop solutions to its various parts was one of the basic premises

of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality. The first step was reduce the nuclear crisis to what were regarded as its three constitutive phases: the pre-attack phase, the attack phase, and the post-attack phase. A phase was defined by a single objective and a set of operations expected to realize that objective. On the basis of this analysis, it would then be possible to develop the specific plans required to solve the distinctive problems of each phase.

The objective of the pre-attack phase was preparedness. This called for a massive public education program that would teach Americans what they needed to know to live through a nuclear attack. It also required a national recruitment program to enroll citizens in training programs for the services that would be essential to the resolution of the nuclear crisis. In 1950, plans were made to recruit fifteen million people to perform volunteer civil defense work. The police service would assist regular law enforcement organizations in patrolling the streets, protecting persons and their property, and arresting or shooting down survivors whose self-control had snapped under the stresses of nuclear attack, compelling them to panic, loot, or riot. The fire service would assist regular fire departments in combating what was expected to be the main source of destruction in a nuclear attack. The welfare service would organize housing, clothing, and mass feeding for the millions of refugees created by the attack. The warden service would organize the mobilization of neighborhoods so that every household would be ready. The rescue service would be responsible for emergency operations to extract survivors from the rubble created by the attack, and the health service would provide emergency medical care. The engineering service would clear away the debris produced by the attack so that main thoroughfares would be open for the transportation service to deliver assistance and supplies. The communications service would operate the media necessary to coordinate all these functions in a national network. The responsible political authorities on federal, state, and local levels would be linked to civil defense organizations on these same levels. Naturally staff services would be required to provide bureaucratic support.

In June, 1951, the FCDA initiated "Alert America," its first national marketing effort. The general objective of Alert America was to promote the program of nuclear crisis management through a campaign that would dramatize the danger of the Soviet threat and convince Americans that civil defense was essential to their survival in the nuclear age. Its specific objectives were twofold: to provide comprehensive information on the fundamentals of civil defense as self-protection to the entire American population; and to persuade fifteen to twenty million Americans to volunteer for training in one of the specialized civil defense services that would be required in the event of a nuclear attack. In 1951 and 1952, the FCDA

produced or sponsored pamphlets, posters, comics, newspaper inserts, radio and television programming, and travelling exhibits designed to realize these objectives.

The most heavily promoted project in the campaign was the Alert America Convoy: three caravans of ten large motor trucks and trailers painted in bold colors. Each convoy carried portable exhibits of posters, blown-up photographs, movies, three-dimensional mock-ups, and dioramas that provided a vivid simulation of nuclear attack. The exhibits were intended to depict as dramatically as possible the effects of an atomic attack on American towns and cities and show the American people what they could do to protect themselves. In 1952, the Alert America Convoy traveled the country for nine months. Visiting armories and civic centers in some seventy cities, it was seen by 1.1 million people.

The newspaper advertising designed for the Alert America Convoy by The Advertising Council theatricalized the civil defense public information program in a format that was characterized as "hard-hitting and dramatic." As the promotional matrices for the Convoy proclaimed:

> The Alert America Convoy is Coming to Town! To show you what atomic warfare is really like . . . to show you how you can protect yourself and your family . . . to show you how Civil Defense can save your life. Don't miss it . . . it's the show that may save your life!

The Alert America exhibits claimed to show Americans how they could "beat the bomb." Alert America was "the most unforgettable show you'll ever see!" and "a 'must' for every American." According to The Advertising Council, the Alert America Convoy was "the most far-reaching public-education project of its kind ever undertaken." It promised to "spearhead a campaign which will alert the citizens of your community to the menace of modern warfare — to show them what *they can do about it through Civil Defense.*"[10]

The objective of the attack phase of the crisis was to survive. Survival would depend upon the mobilization of millions of civil defense volunteers, efforts at self-protection on the part of the American people, state appropriation of private property deemed necessary to national security, the emergency evacuation of threatened populations, and the relocation of officials, organizations, and services judged to be essential to national survival.

The national security establishment regarded the survival of the state and its continuous operation throughout the nuclear crisis as necessary to the survival of the country. In order to maintain the continuity of government, plans were made to protect crucial federal agencies. As a result of these endeavors, the American state would operate during the attack, carry the war to the enemy and bring it to a satisfactory conclusion,

and undertake post-attack reconstruction. Plans to insure the continuity of government were not based on the same principles that governed the civil defense program for the protection of the American people. Continuity of government planning held that certain officers and agencies of the federal government should be protected by the state. This meant that the state would tax the American people to protect itself. The basic assumption of the national civil defense program was self-protection. Ultimately, every American family was responsible for its own survival. Thus the state was not prepared to spend federal revenues in order to secure the survival of the public.

The command and control of the polity and the economy would be guaranteed by establishing a system of leadership and management succession. In every organization crucial to national security, officials would be designated to assume executive responsibilities in case those prior to them in the order of succession were eliminated. Because every organization in every major city was expected to lose its headquarters, alternative operational sites would be selected and equipped, and key personnel would be transported to these sites so that critical functions would not be interrupted.[11]

The objective of the post-attack phase of the crisis was recovery, which would require a reconstruction program and the active cooperation of all survivors to rebuild America. In the early 1950's, civil defense planners seem to have regarded a Soviet nuclear attack not as a remote possibility, but as an imminent reality. Beginning in the autumn of 1951, the NSRB organized an inter-agency planning group in the federal government to solve problems of post-attack rehabilitation. In its plans for reconstruction, the inter-agency group envisioned mobile cadres of specially selected skilled workers, who would be recruited and indoctrinated in the pre-attack phase. After the attack, they would be shuttled from city to city, repairing transportation and communication links, restoring industrial capacity, and rebuilding housing and community facilities. Such an operation would be mandatory since, in the euphemistic language of NSRB planners, "the normal patterns of employment may be severely disturbed or damaged." Planners considered whether the recruitment of these mobile units should rely on volunteers, or whether "compulsion" would be called for.[12]

Detailed proposals were also developed for rebuilding private housing in the post-attack period. Nuclear war was expected to create severe shortages of material and labor, the depletion of private funding for housing construction, and the collapse of the private housing market. However, it was assumed that private construction companies together with their equipment and labor forces as well as state apparatus with the bureaucracy and

the funds needed to reshelter America would all survive and work together to rebuild homes according to pre-attack standards. Post-attack housing reconstruction plans were based on the premise that large tracts of urban residential real estate would be destroyed in an initial first strike. There was also a strong probability of subsequent strikes. Thus post-attack construction sites were contemplated on which workers anxiously scanned the skies for the characteristic flash of a nuclear explosion at the same time that they built new homes for surviving consumers whose dwellings had been destroyed.[13]

The objectives set for the attack and post-attack phases of a nuclear crisis could be met only if careful planning for their execution had already been completed in the pre-attack phase. Pre-attack planning was the key to the resolution of a nuclear crisis. It was obvious that plans for survival could not be made in the weeks and days before the bombs began to fall. The attack — the exact particulars of which need not be delineated for the public with graphic precision — could be managed without excessive hardship only if preparations for pre-attack readiness were in order. But if pre-attack planning was negligent, the nation would not survive, in which case any plans for reconstruction would become pointless.

In order to explore the Cold War conception of nuclear reality more closely, it will be useful to consider in some detail specific plans for managing a nuclear attack.

OPERATION ALERT

Beginning in 1954, the civil defense community initiated a series of full-scale annual rehearsals for World War III based on this managerial conception of nuclear crisis. Christened "Operation Alert," these yearly rituals enacted simulations of nuclear attack in an elaborate national socio-drama that combined elements of disaster relief, the church social, summer camp, and the county fair.

The purpose of Operation Alert was to test pre-attack plans for survival in a fabricated world of nuclear attack. Each Operation Alert was designed as a play, in the sense of both an exercise and a drama. The drama was framed as a grand national epic, in the style of the MGM movie epics that were so popular in the 1950's. Following the logic of nuclear crisis mastery, the plot of the drama moved from threat to crisis to resolution. Naturally the American people emerged from the radioactive mists of nuclear war essentially unchanged, if not altogether unscathed. The outcome of the exercise and the resolution of the dramatic ordeal were a foregone conclusion, preordained by the constraints of nuclear crisis mastery as well as the public relations requirements of the FCDA.

By 1955, the FCDA secured comprehensive national media coverage of Operation Alert. Perhaps more important, publishers and broadcasters collaborated with the FCDA in defining Operation Alert and interpreting its results for the public in conformity with the Cold War conception of nuclear reality. Participants included most agencies of the federal government, with the President and members of the Cabinet playing leading and highly visible roles, scores of cities that had been marked for "destruction," businesses that had developed their own civil defense preparedness plans, organized labor, and thousands of small towns across the country that did not intend to be left out of an event that appealed to the passions of patriotism as well as the interests of civic pride and the competitiveness of community spirit.

The protocol of each Operation Alert was worked out months in advance of the exercise. The main strategic premise was invariably a well coordinated nuclear attack on fifty to one hundred American cities. Participants were expected to test their survival plans and training by following the scenario of the protocol. Generally a date in the summer was reserved, usually including a weekend so that maximum participation would not be compromised by workday responsibilities. The simulated attack occurred on Friday. Over the weekend, the American people and their leaders demonstrated their ability to master the attack by putting into practice civil defense training and survival skills.

The protocol often employed the fiction of telescoping: concentrating into days or hours of simulation the performance of tasks that might require weeks or even months in an actual nuclear war. For example, the first Operation Alert, which postulated an assault on forty important industrial targets as well as a large number of Strategic Air Command bases, was planned as a two-day exercise in June. Its purpose was to test the civil defense organization that the federal government had formed during the previous three and one half years. How effectively would local community civil defense units perform in a nuclear emergency? What efforts on the part of the federal government would be required? Because Operation Alert 1954 was designed to evaluate the response of civil defense organizations, general public participation was not contemplated.[14]

Operation Alert 1955 was a much more ambitious enterprise. Not only the more carefully planned simulation and the increased scope of the exercise, but also the more sophisticated and comprehensive public relations apparatus set in motion to define the event for the American people marked Operation Alert 1955 as a national political event, a public ritual, and a symbolic moment of major importance. Operation Alert 1955 was held on June 15 through 17. The protocol was based on a list of ninety-two "critical target cities." Before the exercise, fifty were designated for simulated

attack. At the beginning of the exercise, seven more would be identified for surprise attack. This meant that the remaining critical target cities would be expected to ready themselves for surprise nuclear bombing or, if that did not occur, be prepared to assist other areas that had been bombed. Estimated casualties were 8.2 million killed, 6.5 million injured, and 24 million left homeless.

The highlight of the test and its most widely publicized feature was the evacuation of the essential functions of the federal government from Washington, based on the assumption that the capital would be destroyed. Accordingly, some 15,000 federal employees, including the President, the Cabinet, and agencies declared to be essential to the continuity of government were relocated to thirty-one undisclosed sites. Here the operations of the American state would continue in the midst of a simulated nuclear holocaust. The President himself would be installed in an emergency White House located some six hours by car from the capital.

Thus the official purpose of the exercise was two-fold: to demonstrate current levels of civil defense preparedness in the country at large and to test plans to maintain the continuity of the American state in a nuclear attack. By demonstrating that the relevant agencies of the federal government and the ninety-two cities chosen for participation were able to carry out the protocol of the exercise, Operation Alert would confirm an essential premise of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality. Given careful planning and proper management, the American people could sustain a nuclear strike and survive without the imposition of draconian measures that violated their political traditions.

However, this demonstration depended on whether the civil defense community was able to define Operation Alert so that the public perceived the exercise as a conformation of the success of nuclear crisis mastery. The operation would succeed only if the public understood it as a success. This effort to interpret Operation Alert for the American people was the purpose of a concerted press and public relations campaign initiated some six weeks before the exercise.

Instructions concerning the management of public information at the government relocation sites were distributed to the relocation officers of each participating government agency. In order to guarantee a realistic simulation, agencies were advised not to allow families of employees to accompany or visit them during the operation. In order to establish a seamless consistency in the public relations of the event, participating federal employees were given basic guidance on how to handle the press. A briefing on the public relations strategy of Operation Alert was held for the public information officers of the principal agencies taking part. This meeting was

followed up by more detailed conferences with individual government officials.

Given the planning assumptions of the exercise, the capital would be destroyed. Thus all participating federal agencies would obviously be unable to release information from their offices in Washington. Further, the real conditions of a nuclear attack would preclude press coverage at relocation sites. The government wanted to encourage maximum press coverage of Operation Alert and at the same time subject it to strict, but unobjectionable, controls. For this purpose, the government established NEWPOINT, a media center with the sole function of releasing government-generated news concerning Operation Alert. Located in an office building in Richmond, Virginia, NEWPOINT provided the concentration of resources and personnel needed to control the media effectively. By outfitting NEWPOINT with elaborate communications technology and providing ample staffing, the government simplified the task of reporting on Operation Alert. Plans were made to install not only basic communications equipment for print and broadcast media, but also additional telephone and telegraph facilities for the large number of journalists who, it was hoped, would use the new press facilities. A pre-operation press briefing was held to determine in advance the number of journalists who would be on hand at NEWPOINT. This meeting would lay the groundwork for solving potential media problems before the exercise was actually under way. Operation Alert planners wanted to make sure that the appropriate facilities would be in place to enable all reporters to file their stories directly from NEWPOINT. For this purpose, the NEWPOINT press room remained open for operations around the clock from the beginning of the exercise to its termination. In anticipation of the large number of journalists expected for the event, back-up government information officers were brought in from the United States Information Agency and the Department of Defense to serve on the Operation Alert press staff.

NEWPOINT was a creature of the White House, set up and operated by the Office of the Press Secretary to the President. All information emanating from the relocation sites and all contact between the press and participating government officials were managed directly by the White House. By guaranteeing the participation of the President, Cabinet officers, and the press officers of the executive branch, all of whom were regular sources of information for Washington journalists, the government made sure that Operation Alert would be a major news item. By locating journalists in a single office building, isolating them from the relocation sites, and feeding them appropriately timed releases and pool radio and television coverage from these sites produced by the White House public relations apparatus, the government attempted to insure that press coverage

would follow, and ideally reproduce, its own conception of Operation Alert as nuclear crisis mastery.[15]

An advance meeting with media executives was held to establish ground rules for the coverage of Operation Alert, work out specific plans for coverage, and identify and resolve any problems the executives might foresee. By including media executives in planning the coverage of Operation Alert, the White House and the FCDA were able to employ editors, publishers, and broadcasters in managing the most effective presentation of the exercise to the public. In the collaboration between media executives and government officials, an interesting modus vivendi emerged. The interest of the government in promoting a specific interpretation of Operation Alert was linked with the interest of the press in producing commercially viable news articles and broadcasts. As a result of these joint efforts, the government enjoyed considerable success in using the media to refine and then distribute the official interpretation of Operation Alert as a demonstration of nuclear crisis management.

Network media executives made suggestions for radio and television coverage that were much more comprehensive than the government originally intended. In considering the most effective coverage of the President, they proposed live radio and television reporting from the Eisenhower's headquarters. This would make possible live broadcasts by the networks from the emergency White House or tapes that could be inserted into regularly scheduled programming. Following the government's conception of Operation Alert as a confirmation of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality, media executives urged that the President deliver a live radio and television address from his headquarters early in the exercise. Such a broadcast would achieve one of the main objectives of the exercise: to show that "the President is alive and working and that the government is in operation." The media chiefs also recommended that the closed circuit television communications between the President and the various government relocation centers be made available to network representatives at NEWPOINT, arguing that a controlled demonstration on commercial television of the ability of the government to function in a nuclear emergency would be "most newsworthy" as well as "most reassuring to the American people."[16]

Following the plan of Operation Alert 1955, the objectives of Operation Alert 1956 were also articulated within the framework of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality. The exercise would acquaint government officials, civil defense workers, and the public at large with the problems that were likely to arise in nuclear warfare. It would also "test the national readiness" to respond to these problems. By identifying deficiencies in the

current level of civil defense readiness, the test would provide a basis for more sophisticated training and improved plans and programs.[17]

In Operation Alert 1956, the production of a ritualized national simulation of a nuclear attack became more systematic and highly rationalized. By approximating the conditions of a real attack more closely, civil defense planners attempted to strengthen the claim that Operation Alert demonstrated the American capacity for nuclear crisis mastery. As a result, the interpretation of the exercise promoted by the government would be validated. A number of refinements not present in earlier plans were introduced to tighten the correspondence between simulation and actual attack. In Operation Alert 1956, some ninety-seven thermonuclear bombs were exploded over fifty-two cities. An unspecified number of additional bombs were exploded over air bases, Atomic Energy Commission installations, and eleven smaller cities. Other enemy actions expected to be coordinated with a major nuclear attack — such as the mining of ports, submarine attacks against coastal shipping and missile attacks launched from submarines, commando raids, and internal sabotage — were also included in the attack protocol.

The attack pattern outlined in the protocol specified both the number and yield of enemy nuclear weapons to be delivered on American targets, the types of explosive bursts — on the surface or in the air — and approximate ground zeroes as well as times of detonation. In order to retain "an element of surprise," the exact locations of each explosion were not distributed to state and local civil defense organizations until the beginning of the exercise. Operation Alert 1956 assumed no strategic warning — the weeks or months of political tensions that would produce evidence of Soviet preparations for a nuclear offensive. There was a minimum tactical warning of one hundred minutes, the expected time that would elapse between the launching of the first enemy forces and the explosion of the first bombs.[18]

Operation Alert 1956 scheduled a seven-day exercise, beginning on Friday July 20 and ending on Thursday July 26. This represented an attempt to reduce the artificial telescoping of time, events, and operations that was responsible for an important discrepancy between simulation and reality in the exercises of 1954 and 1955. To the extent that this was practicable, the sequence of actions planned for the exercise reproduced the sequence of actions that would be called for in a well-designed national civil defense effort during the first seven days following an actual attack.

Another innovation of Operation Alert 1956 was the development of more realistic casualty and damage estimates. These new figures were arrived at through two modifications: by introducing the variable of casualties

produced by expected patterns of radioactive fallout; and by making assessments of casualties and damage during the exercise itself, using only those instruments and methods of measurement presumed to be available after the attack. Civil defense planners also developed criteria for evaluating the quality of nuclear crisis management during the operation. These standards, which were used to assess the readiness of government agencies participating in the exercise, would provide a benchmark for further improvements in preparedness. In order to arrive at a systematic assessment of performance during the event, each participating federal agency was required to form an inspection team that would work with inspectors assigned by the Office of Defense Mobilization. Finally a higher level of civil defense readiness and more comprehensive nationwide participation were encouraged by a new program of incentives and awards, including a "Presidential Unit Commendation for meritorious performance."

Like the architects of Operation Alert 1955, the planners of Operation Alert 1956 attempted to frame a public interpretation of the exercise that conformed to the requirements of nuclear crisis mastery. The seriousness with which Operation Alert was taken outside the government and the success of civil defense strategists in promoting an interpretation of nuclear attack within the framework of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality are nicely illustrated by a telegram sent on the first day of the exercise by AFL-CIO President George Meany, himself no mean Cold Warrior, to President Eisenhower. "In this dark hour of our nation's history," Meany gravely announced, "I want to pledge to you the fullest support of American workers. All America must work together to repel attacks of the enemy, to restore damage, and to mount an offensive that will carry us to victory." Following the logic of nuclear crisis mastery, Meany conceived a nuclear attack as a managerial problem that could be solved by the proper organization and deployment of skilled labor power. After giving his personal promise to Eisenhower that no AFL-CIO member unions would engage in strikes or work stoppages that would interfere with civil defense, he emphasized that unions were ready to provide the manpower needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation. "Throughout the nation," Meany assured the President, "groups of skilled union workers are ready to serve on special assignments to meet the needs of bombed-out areas."[19]

Local civil defense organizations throughout the country did their part to insure that the objectives of Operation Alert 1956 would be met. In Canton, Ohio, Mercy Hospital evacuated patients, personnel, and supplies to a special field hospital twenty miles from the city. According to the Operation Alert protocol for Canton, the hydrogen bomb designated for explosion over the city would destroy Mercy Hospital and

leave the city's other two hospitals badly damaged or contaminated by radioactivity. Although original plans allotted two hours for the Mercy Hospital evacuation, the entire operation was performed in less than ninety minutes, to the immense satisfaction of hospital administrators and civil defense officials. The five-floor hospital was cleared of 270 patients, personnel, and critical supplies in only forty-five minutes. Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and members of B'nai B'rith volunteered to take the role of patients. In order to make the exercise more realistic, Operation Alert patients were tagged to duplicate the actual patients in the hospital and were classified and evacuated as litter, chair, or ambulatory cases. Ninety percent of the hospital personnel responsible for conducting the evacuation were women, assisted by local civil defense organizations and law enforcement agencies. At the field hospital, a reception area for bombing victims was set up. Radiological monitoring teams and decontamination units tested survivors for radioactive contamination and provided emergency treatment. Mass feeding for the one thousand participants in the exercise was also organized. The County Restaurant Association prepared sandwiches, soups, and beverages, which were served by the local chapter of the American Red Cross. Local officials stressed the importance of planning, organization, and close cooperation in making the evacuation of the hospital a success. Canton Civil Defense Director William L. Murphy observed with pride that he "couldn't believe everything has gone so smoothly."[20]

In Wright City, Missouri, forty-four miles west of St. Louis on U.S. highway 40, the local civil defense organization managed the reception and care of evacuees from the hydrogen bomb attack on St. Louis. On the second day of Operation Alert, Wright City was fully prepared for the exodus from St. Louis. Large signs directing evacuees to the Wright City public park were posted at all strategic locations. The civil defense auxiliary police service, "smart in their crisp uniforms," were stationed on U.S. 40 to direct incoming traffic. Families from St. Louis County playing the role of evacuees were registered by a team of five women. Each registrant was assigned an identification number in order to systematize feeding, housing, and medical care. Supervised by the director of the Wright City school lunch program, members of six local women's service organizations prepared and served a meal of stew, "hot corn flakes," and coffee. A first-aid station was set up in a tent, where evacuees were given emergency medical treatment by trained personnel using equipment transported from St. Louis. As in Canton, local officials praised the efficiency of the operation and the planning, training, and teamwork that made it possible.[21]

THE PARADOXES OF NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Throughout the Eisenhower presidency, FCDA public relations glibly promised the American people that they could survive nuclear war by keeping their heads and following a few simple rules. Privately, the Eisenhower national security team recognized the futility of the doctrine of nuclear crisis mastery, even as it promoted this doctrine to the country as the only means of survival.

During the first three years of the Eisenhower presidency, the view of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality held by senior government officials changed significantly. Although questions about the feasibility of nuclear crisis management were raised in 1953-54, confidence in its basic premises remained unshaken. Planning for the continuity of government, the protection of the economy, and the survival of the American people proceeded accordingly. However, by the summer of 1955, Eisenhower and his chief advisors began to question the principal assumptions on which nuclear crisis management was based. The crucial event in this shift from confidence to doubt seems to have been the experience of planning and evaluating Operation Alert 1955. Although this was the second Operation Alert, it was the first large-scale, nationwide simulation of a nuclear attack. It was also the first exercise that called for the participation of thousands of government officials as well as millions of American citizens. After 1955, Operation Alert exhibits a paradoxical relation between the intentions and the consequences of civil defense planning. The objective of Operation Alert was to demonstrate the feasibility of nuclear crisis management. However, the senior officials who assessed these exercises were gradually pressed to the conclusion that this objective could not be realized. Operation Alert seemed to show that a nuclear crisis could not be resolved by the exercise of managerial rationality. Thus the performance of Operation Alert appeared to refute, ironically and paradoxically, the Cold War conception of nuclear reality on which it was based.

By June, 1955, when the Cabinet began to sift what had been learned from Operation Alert 1955, Eisenhower and his senior advisors seem to have concluded that a nuclear attack was not a possible object of planning. Its magnitude and the number of imponderable variables it introduced made the prospect of managing a nuclear crisis an absurdity. This conclusion amounted to a repudiation of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality. Because the norms of the pre-attack world would not apply to post-attack conditions, it would be illusory to represent these conditions by extrapolating the logic of pre-attack existence onto post-attack life.

As a result, much of the discussion of new initiatives to be taken in light of Operation Alert 1955 has a dreamlike quality. At the same time that the Cabinet considered how the government might indemnify property owners for damage suffered in a nuclear war, it also rejected the premises on which this discussion made sense. The President observed that under the conditions of "chaos" entailed by the planning assumptions of Operation Alert, it would be necessary to govern the country as one big, closely regimented camp. This meant that the post-attack world would realize one of the ultimate nightmares of Cold War planners in both the Truman and the Eisenhower presidencies: America as a garrison state, in which the basic rights and liberties the United States was prepared to defend by risking nuclear war would be destroyed from within by the very measures required to wage such a war. According to Eisenhower:

> No longer would only the armed services bear the brunt of war. Millions of homeless people would have to be sustained and helped and fed in soup kitchens and, compared with this responsibility, the objective of indemnifying property loss seemed rather insignificant. People will be lucky if their losses are only property — and not their own lives.[22]

As Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson added, "if we lose the war, the people will lose all their property anyway."[23]

By the summer of 1955, Eisenhower concluded that the routines of American life would lose their validity in the post-attack world. Commenting on Operation Alert 1955, he warned that "we must stop depending on things that sustain usual life in a State." Even the planning assumptions of Operation Alert — which would reduce American life to "chaos" — were unrealistic in their optimism. Operation Alert assumed a single massive nuclear strike against the United States. However, there was no reason to suppose that a first strike would be the last. As Eisenhower reminded the Cabinet:

> All the ordinary processes by which we run this country will simply not work under the circumstances we have assumed here. Our great fundamental problem will be how to mobilize what is left of 165 million people and win a war.[24]

The Cold War conception of nuclear reality presupposed a general plan for managing a nuclear crisis that could be adjusted to the local conditions of each part of the country. However, the scale of a nuclear attack, the impossibility of predicting its effects, the inability to determine whether a first strike would be followed by others and, if so, what the consequences of these later attacks might be, nullified this presupposition. In commenting on the many possible contingencies that might arise in a nuclear war, Eisenhower argued that "in logic one could say that we ought to have an infinite number of plans to cover all the contingencies."[25] But an infinite number of plans is an absurdity, the logical equivalent of no plan at all.

Thus Eisenhower seemed to perceive, perhaps dimly, that a nuclear attack was not a possible managerial problem. Planning would become a hopeless undertaking, since the conditions for its possibility would no longer be satisfied. Although not given to metaphor, Eisenhower suggested that this was " 'the new face' that war was wearing."[26] It seemed to be a face without a visage. The dimensions of a nuclear war were indeterminate. Its character was indefinable. Thus it was impossible to say what it would really look like.

Eisenhower ended the Cabinet meeting with a chilling observation on the real value of civil defense exercises such as Operation Alert. In the summary of the Secretary to the Cabinet:

> The President concluded by reflecting aloud on the deterrent effect of a test of this nature on the Soviet General Staff. War seen in this light would reveal itself to anyone as only an unmitigated catastrophe. Our test would probably not impress the Russians, but if they, knowing full well that we would hit them back in the event of such aggression upon us, ran such a test of their own, their eyes would be opened. If they should ever play out any of these problems for themselves, as we have done, such an exercise might well give them pause.[27]

Thus the rhetoric of the FCDA public information program was profoundly misleading. Because nuclear war would constitute an "unmitigated catastrophe," a nuclear attack could not be handled by careful planning, organization, and management. Civil defense as nuclear crisis mastery was out of the question — a deception practiced on the American people for reasons of state and justifiable only on the basis of the higher logic and metaphysics of national security. It followed that the deterrent value national security strategists had ascribed to civil defense was also worthless. The conception of civil defense as a deterrent assumed that Americans would be able to protect their own home front from the worst the Soviets could do. Given this assumption, the Soviets would conclude that the costs of nuclear aggression outweighed its benefits. However, civil defense as self-protection turned out to be nothing more than an elaborate marketing strategy. Therefore, it obviously could not qualify as a deterrent in the way it had generally been conceived.

In spite of these considerations, Eisenhower argued that civil defense might function as a deterrent in a quite different, ironic, and morbid sense. Although Operation Alert was represented as a demonstration of virtually effortless nuclear crisis mastery, in fact it showed that there was no possible protection against a nuclear attack. Nuclear war would visit unimaginable horrors on its victims, who could do nothing to escape them. In their examination of Operation Alert, the Soviets would be forced to the same conclusion. Moreover, they would reflexively apply this proof of the failure of nuclear crisis mastery to their own situation. Soviet society would become

the object of a hypothetical Operation Alert, a thought experiment that would open the eyes of Soviet war planners in the same way that Operation Alert had shattered the illusions of Eisenhower and his advisors. Once Soviet strategists caught a glimpse of "the new face of war," they would grasp the impossibility of protecting themselves against an American counterstrike and the terrible consequences they would suffer should they decide to strike first. Thus civil defense would serve as a deterrent by demonstrating its own futility.

Perhaps Eisenhower's most somber observations on the fallacies of the Cold War conception of nuclear reality are his personal diary entries. On January 23, 1956, Eisenhower recorded his reflections on a report concerning the damage that could be anticipated in the initial stage of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, postulated to begin on July 1, 1956. The report analyzed two scenarios. The first assumed no strategic warning at all and only the tactical warning provided by the American Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, the point in their flight at which Soviet aircraft could be detected by American radar. The second assumed a strategic warning of one month, but no specific information about the date of the attack.

In the first scenario, the United States suffers virtually complete economic collapse. The federal government is wiped out, and new political arrangements are improvised by the states. Casualties are, of course, much higher than the government's public predictions indicated. Although sixty-five percent of the population would require medical care, most injuries would go unattended. What was the impact of civil defense planning on limiting the destruction produced by this hypothetical attack? What would nuclear crisis mastery achieve? It seemed that civil defense would accomplish nothing. Eisenhower noted that "the limiting factor on the damage inflicted was not so much our own defense arrangements as the limitations on the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons."[28] The crucial factor in defining the level of destruction was not civil defense, the effects of which would be negligible. The brute fact of the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal would determine the amount of damage. Regardless of American efforts, the destruction produced by a Soviet nuclear offensive would be a simple function of the number of nuclear weapons delivered on target. Thus in the aftermath of such an attack, "it would literally be a business of digging ourselves out of ashes, of starting again."[29]

In the second scenario, the Soviets emphasize strikes on air bases rather than attacks against cities. Yet the analysis of this scenario indicated that American losses would not differ significantly from those produced by the first scenario. This meant that in the month between the warning and the attack, civil defense would be virtually worthless in limiting damage.

Eisenhower concluded that there was only one way the United States could reduce its losses. During the month of strategic warning, America would have to take the initiative and launch a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. However, a pre-emptive attack was contrary to American traditions. In addition, it would require Congress to meet in a secret session and vote a declaration of war that would be carried out even before the session ended. The President regarded such an extraordinary emergency procedure as an impossibility and rejected it as a serious planning option.

CONCLUSION

After Operation Alert 1955, planning for a nuclear crisis exhibited several anomalies. Each year, Operation Alert was carried out, even though Eisenhower and his lieutenants seemed to think it was self-defeating. Although the exercises were intended to show how well the American people could protect themselves in a nuclear attack, in the judgment of the national security elite they demonstrated exactly the contrary: Self-protection was impossible. The FCDA continued to promote the project of nuclear crisis mastery to the public even though the national security establishment had concluded that there were no prospects for its success. The FCDA and the White House continued to publicly espouse the view that America would remain essentially unchanged by a nuclear attack. After the debris was cleared away and the reconstruction begun, the familiar American institutions would all reappear in place. They maintained this position in spite of their private position that a nuclear attack would constitute a unique catastrophe, immediately transforming America in ways that could not be anticipated or even imagined.

In the end, perhaps Eisenhower and his advisors grasped, however uncertainly, that the Cold War conception of nuclear reality was vitiated by its own circularity. Civil defense presupposed precisely the state of affairs it was intended to reestablish: an ensemble of functioning social, economic, and political institutions. In the absence of a viable institutional order, the organizations on which civil defense depended could not be formed and the operations it required could not be carried out. However, in a functioning social order, civil defense would seem to be unnecessary. Thus civil defense was either impossible or redundant.

The tasks required for the production of survival presupposed certain tacit conditions that are never mentioned in the civil defense program, even though they are essential to its objectives. These conditions define an implicit minimum of social order that must obtain for the public to carry out civil defense procedures.

Even the ability to take unlimited hot showers to eliminate the danger of radioactive contamination — which the civil defense classic *Survival Under Atomic Attack* assumed without further comment — presupposes that the destruction caused by a nuclear attack will leave American society essentially as it was. This assumption takes for granted that in the wake of a nuclear attack, the political, economic, and technological infrastructure of American society will remain intact. Highways will be open and streets will be cleared of debris so that workers can make their way to utility plants. These plants will be in operating condition, the homes of workers and managers will remain standing, and communications systems necessary to inform workers concerning the post-attack work schedule will function. The financial apparatus and the reward structure of the economy will still be in place. Plants will not be abandoned by managers looking out for themselves and their families. Workers on the way to their jobs will not be threatened by rioting mobs. They will appear at work at the appropriate time and perform more or less as usual. Thus members of the labor force will not only be alive and uninjured, but also psychologically and morally prepared to perform their normal functions. Fear of new attacks will not keep the work force at home, perhaps boarding up the house, maintaining a furtive lookout for post-attack looters, mounting a machine gun at the entrance of the family shelter in order to fend off invaders, or preparing an escape to safer ground. On the contrary, people will maintain their everyday roles and fulfill their pre-attack responsibilities. All these conditions and others as well must obtain if the water is to flow when the American public turns on the faucet for the first post-attack shower.

These presuppositions are not secured by civil defense. On the contrary, they are the unsecured basis on which civil defense rests. In their absence, the measures required by civil defense cannot be taken. If they obtain, then the United States has demonstrated its ability to survive and recover, in which case civil defense is not needed. The paradoxical result is that if civil defense is necessary, then it is impossible. If it is possible, then it is not necessary.[30]

NOTES

1. John Morton Blum, *V Was for Victory: Politics and Culture During World War II* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 16.
2. See Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman, "Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 5 (1992), pp. 361-403.
3. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter abbreviated as DDEL], Papers of Katherine Howard, box 9, folder: Project East River.
4. For details of the history of Project East River, a complete list of personnel, and the phasing of the various stages of planning, briefings, research, and writing, see *Report of*

the Project East River: General Report, Part I, Appendix IA: Historical Summary of Project East River Operations (New York: Associated Universities, Inc., 1952).
5. *Report of the Project East River, General Report, Part I,* p. 2.
6. *Report of the Project East River, General Report, Part I,* p. i.
7. *Report of the Project East River, General Report, Part I,* p. 2.
8. *Report of the Project East River, General Report, Part I,* p. i.
9. *Report of the Project East River, General Report, Part I,* p. 4.
10. Harry S. Truman Library [hereafter abbreviated as HSTL], Papers of Harry S. Truman, Files of Spencer R. Quick, box 5, Civil Defense Campaign — General, folder l; box 1, Civil Defense Programs; box 5, folder: Civil Defense Campaign Correspondence. The volunteer advertising agency assigned by The Advertising Council to develop the Alert America campaign was Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn. The convoys were declared a popular success. In April, 1952, the advertising magazine *Tide* observed, perhaps with some exaggeration: "So far, the response has been terrific, with mobs thronging the exhibits wherever they appear" (p. 38).
11. On early plans to maintain the continuity of the federal government under nuclear attack, see HSTL, Psychological Strategy Board Files, box 34, file: 384.51 Project East River. On early plans to maintain industrial production under the same conditions, see National Archives [hereafter NA], Record Group 304, NSRB Central Files, July, 1949–April, 1953, box 102, folder: Publicity for Post-Attack Rehabilitation Program.
12. See NA, Record Group 304, NSRB Central Files, July, 1949–April, 1953, box 101, folders: Labor Supply and Manpower; Post-Attack Rehabilitation, General.
13. See NA, Record Group 304, NSRB Central Files, July, 1949–April, 1953, box 102, William V. Reed, "A Study of Housing Problems in Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation," January, 16, 1952, and "A Study of Housing Problems in Post-Attack Industrial Rehabilitation: Phase Two," August, 19, 1952.
14. DDEL, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President [hereafter DDEP], Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, box 5, file: 182nd meeting of NSC, January 28, 1954.
15. On the reproduction by the national media of the interpretation of Operation Alert as nuclear crisis mastery, see *Newsweek,* June 27, 1955, "Civil Defense: So Much to Be Done," pp. 21-22; *Time,* June 27, 1955, "Civil Defense: Best Defense? Prayer," pp. 17-18; and *U.S. News and World Report,* June 24, 1955, "When Ike 'Fled' Washington," pp. 66-69.
16. DDEL, DDEP, White House Central Files, Official File, box 658, folder: OF 113-B-5, letter from Bryson Rash to James Hagerty, June 2, 1955.
17. DDEL, DDEP, Ann Whitman File, Cabinet Series, box 7, folder: Cabinet Meeting of July 13, 1956, Cabinet Paper — Privileged (April 2, 1956).
18. Cabinet Meeting of July 13, 1956, Cabinet Paper — Privileged (April 2, 1956).
19. DDEL, DDEP, White House Central Files, Official File, box 658, folder: OF 133-B-5, telegram from George Meany to the President, July 20, 1956.
20. *Newsletter: By, For and About Women in Civil Defense,* #16 (Battle Creek, MI: FCDA, n.d. [1956]), p. 4.
21. *Newsletter: By. For and About Women in Civil Defense,* #16, p. 5.
22. DDEL, DDEP, Ann Whitman File, Cabinet Series, box 5, folder: Minutes of Cabinet meeting of June 17, 1955, p. 1.
23. Minutes of Cabinet meeting of June 17, 1955, p. 2.
24. Minutes of Cabinet meeting of June 17, 1955, p. 2.
25. Minutes of Cabinet meeting of June 17, 1955, p. 5.
26. Minutes of Cabinet meeting of June 17, 1955, p. 6.
27. Minutes of Cabinet meeting of June 17, 1955, p. 8.
28. DDEL, DDEP, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries Series, box 12, folder: January, 1956 Diary, p. 1.
29. January, 1956 Diary, p. 2.
30. Research on this paper was supported with funds from the Harry S. Truman Library Institute and the Jack T. Kvernland Chair, Monmouth College. For advice on sources,

thanks are due to Dennis Bilger of the Harry S. Truman Library and Dwight Strandberg of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.